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Duri.ng the first quarter of this century, many changes were occurr-
ing in the American economic and social structure. America was entering 
into the era of "big business" with commercial activities expanding into 
large statewide and nationwide systems of distribution, no longer iso-
lated to local markets. The rapid expansion of the American economy 
also brought changes to the banking industry. Additional capital was 
needed to finance the new growth, as well as to aid developing industry. 
Bankers, to keep up with the changing economy, began to analyze the 
structure of their institutions searching for ways to expand. Legisla-
tors in certain states had also,recognized a need for new laws in the 
banking field, to stimulate growth. One solution which had worked for 
many years in Canada was the branch bank system of banking. Branch 
banking in its simplest common denominator, is an association of banking 
offices operating in more than one city or town, locally managed but all 
under the direction on one board of directors and operating upon the 
capital of the whole bank. 1 
One of the most important changes in banking law occurred in 
California in 1909. California banking law was rewritten to permit 
statewide branch banking. Prior to the Bank Acp.of 1909, a few banks 
were practicing branch banking on a limited basis, generally within a 
few miles of the main office. The law now allowed banks to establish 
l 
a branch anywhere in the state upon approval of the California super-
intendent of banking. It had been recognized that there were many 
communities in California without adequate local banking facilities and 
needed capital resources. 
2 
California's legislators had opened the door for the state's bank-
ers to develop state branch bank systems. The new law itself was 
additional aid for development, because its authorization process was 
positive. In administering the law the state banking department found 
itself defending the right of any state bank to expand within the terms 
of the law. Furthermore, an amendment to the 1909 Banking Act known as 
the Merger Act facilitated the expansion of branch systems by permitting 
the merger of two or more banks through mere exchange of stock without 
the necessity of using or adding new capital. 2 Few bankers recognized 
the importance of these provisions for many years and the profound 
effect they would have on the future of California banking. 
In addition to the changing banking laws, California's economic, 
agriculture and social structure fostered the development of branch 
banking. California is particularly suited for branch banking because 
of her industries and lack of synchronization in the seasonal demands 
for loans. Crops grown in California mature at different times and as a 
result, the demand for loans to plant or harvest varies from place to 
place. The banker, by studying the state's crop patterns, could shift 
funds from one area to another, making maximum use of existing capital. 
This process is much more effective using a branch bank system, than 
through the alternative of bank correspondents between various unit 
banks, in the state. 3 
Some California bankers were also studying the social structure of 
their industry. It was felt that branch banking could help change the 
attitude toward banks during this period. "The banks", said Woodrow 
Wilson when president of Princeton University, "were the most jealously 
regarded and least liked instrument of business in the country. 114 As 
banks grew, they became more remote from the people and people began to 
"regard them as not belonging to them but as belonging to some power 
hostile to them. "5 
With leaders such as Wilson fighting for new attitudes toward the 
3 
public by bankers, change slowly began. Some bankers began to recognize 
that banks needed more intimate contact with the public. As the banks 
grew and their customer base spread, close contact with the public was 
more difficult to maintain. What seemed to be needed was a system of 
branch banks that were simply and inexpensively managed, which would put 
the resources of rich banks of the major cities throughout the state, 
while maintaining the uniqueness of each area's bank in its locale. 
The first bank to actively respond to the changing conditions in 
the California banking community was the Bank of Italy, which eventually 
became the Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association. 6 
Since its founding in 1904 in San Francisco by Amadeo Peter Giannini 
(or A.P.), Bank of America has grown to be the largest bank in the world 
not affiliated with a government. Of all the many banking institutions 
which had their origin in the United States, none perhaps has stood out 
so untraditionally in its methods, and so rapid in its growth as the 
Bank of America. 
This growth can be attributed to Giannini ~,nd his unswerving deter-
mination in building a branch system. He had been inspired throughout 
not merely by a desire for the growth of his own institution, but by a 
4 
sincere belief that he could thereby be of value to the farmers, workers 
and businessmen of the entire state of California. The growth of the 
Bank of America was not simply in its resources but also in the geog-
raphic distribution of its branches in California and eventually the 
world. 
Justification of the Study 
It is generally recognized that the presence of a reasonably well 
functioning financial system in an area is an important condition for 
economic growth and that the overall patterns of banking are not always 
sharp. 7 Banking institutions have not often been the subject of geog-
raphic investigation. Roberson suggests, in his geographic study of the 
Oregon bank system that, "there is a wealth of opportunity for further 
8 descriptions and analyses of the banking industry by geographers." 
Girling states in his study of the early banking system in the 
United States that: 
• • • many basic functions and institutions have diffused 
across the land. An important institution for a develop-
ing country is banking, for the location as well as mere 
provis~on of credit is based upon private entrepreneurial 
drive. 
The growth and expansion of the Bank of America's branch bank system may 
be viewed as one aspect of this development process. The Bank of 
America was ,a pioneer in this field in the United States, and offers the 
researcher the opportunity to examine the overall patterns of adoption, 
by its branches into one statewide banking system. 
Purpose 
The primary purpose of this thesis will be to study the historical 
5 
geographic development and growth of the Bank of America branch bank 
system from 1904 to 1970. Descriptive analysis and a series of maps 
lllustrat ing the changes in the branch bank system will be used to 
evaluate and analyze this growth and development. The study will focus 
primarily from the founding of the bank in 1904, through final consoli-
dation of the major independent banking units acquired by the Bank of 
America into one statewide system in 1937. It is hoped that this thesis 
will provide insight into the changing spatial distribution of the Bank 
of America during the study period. Additionally it could stimulate 
further geographical research into the banking industry. It is felt 
that in the final analysis it will add to the amount of literature 
presently available in the geography of banking and provide a better 
understanding of the banking industry. 
Methodology 
The location of each branch which was either merged or established 
de novo, 10 was obtained from data contained in various editions of the 
Rand-McNally Banker's Directory, 1900-1970, or in records provided by 
the Bank of America's archives. This allowed for construction of maps 
and tables of the Bank of America for certain periods of time. 
By tracing the Bank of Italy from its founding in 1904, then by 
adding the major independent banks (which were later merged into the 
statewide branch system) a geographical picture of the bank's develop-
ment will be constructed. These major independent banks include: 
Liberty Bank; Bank of America, Los Angeles; Conunercial National Bank 
and Trust of Los Angeles; Southern Trust and Commerce Bank of San Diego; 
United Bank and Trust Company of San Francisco; Rumbolt Bank; Hellman 
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Commercial Trust and Savings Bank; French-American Corporation, Inde-
pendent System; Merchants National Trust and Savings Bank of Los Angeles; 
Bank of America (State). 
This paper will investigate the growth and development of the Bank 
of Italy, the acquisition of the other independent bank systems in chron-
ological periods of time, until absorption and consolidation into the one 
Bank of America system in 1937. Subsequently the study will proceed to 
examine, map and discuss the onE: statewide branch bank system of the Bank 
of America through 1970. The chronological periods chosen coincide with 
major developments in the bank history, as well as that of California. 
Periods chosen are: 1904-1920; 1920-1927; 1927-1938; 1938-1970. It is 
felt that these historical periods will allow for proper examination and 
discussion of the events affecting the Bank of America. 
The paper is organized to allow for a discussion of A. P. Giannini, 
the bank's founder and his later successors during the study period. 
This allows for a discussion of the Bank of America's policies and plan 
of operation. It is important to understand the ideas of A. P. Giannini 
and his operational methods to gain an understanding of why the Bank of 
America has had such a successful history. 
The Problem 
With this background in mind, the study will proceed to investigate 
some important questions affecting the growth and distribution of the 
Bank of America in California. These include: 
1) How did the policies of the Bank of America affect the 
growth of its statewide branch bank sy~tem? 
2) What was the effect of the population composition and 
growth of California on the growth of the Bank of America? 
3) How did various state or federal banking laws or 
officials affect the growth of the Bank of America? 
4) Did the Bank of America branch bank system expand 
in any discernable regional patterns in California? 
It is recognized that the Bank of America is an international 
banking organization and discussion of its worldwide operations is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. The study area will include just the 
state of California between the years 1904-1970. It is also recognized 
that at one time or another the Bank of America has held or controlled 
various banks in different states in the United Staces. These banks 
will not be considered in this study. 
This thesia is basically a descriptive analysis of the spatial 
development of the Bank of America. Although co:iclusions from the 
questions raised will ce made, the r.1ajor emphasis is to describe the 
bank's development, and the relationship between the bank and the state 
during the study period. 
Review of Literature 
The liternture dealing with banking is abundant in terms of arti-
cles written and the wide variety of topics. This is reflected in the 
published literature where banking studies have taken many different 
approaches. Topics vary from management and organization to branch or 
11 
unit banking, just to name a few. 
Even with the widespread interest in the banking industry, one 
fleld which has shown little interest in banking is geography. Geog-
raphers have studied a number of commercial actiyities such as retail 
or wholesale outlet distribution, 12 farm procuction, 13 the mining in-
14 clustry, but rarely banking, which is important to each. Geographical 
7 
8 
studies of just one bank or one bank branch system were not found, al-
though there were studies dealing with a state or region's banking 
system. Each of these studies discussed the geographic aspects of bank-
ing and each approached their topic in a different manner. 
In his thesis of banking in early America, Girling15 studied the 
banking as an innovation and how it diffused across the eastern United 
States. He approaches the early banking system through the spatial man-
ifestation of this particular innovation, and directs his attention to 
the patterns and mechanism of diffusion. His analysis reveals the close 
correspondence between economic conditions and the rate of bank estab-
lishment. It was found even in early banking in America, bankers 
economically rationalized their site location. Bankers competed for 
customers, bearing the repercussions of their spatial arrangement of 
facilities. 
Roberson in his paper on the geographical history of banking in 
Oregon, approaches his topic through large blocks of time, arranged 
chronologically by chapters.16 rn his study he tries to make distinctions 
and show variations in the distribution of banks in Oregon. The pat-
terns which occur become the primary focus of his thesis. His geograph-
ical analysis shows a general overall picture of Oregon's banking system. 
While these two studies examine geographical patterns of banking in 
the United States, Engberg and Hance17 analyze the expansion and disper-
sion of commercial bank branches in tropical Africa. They discuss the 
role which British and French institutions influenced the growth of lo-
cal banks. The study shows correlations between,.the economics of the 
countries discussed and bank growth. Noting that ,the period is one 
which many tropical African countries were gaining independence, they 
conclude that the major influence in bank growth in the area is the po-
litical climate. It is easy to see that the studies found indeed vary 
a great deal in their approaches and conclusions made. 
Outside geography, there were a few studies found discussing bank-
ing in a geographic perspective but no attempt was made to spatially 
organize the studies. 
Pugh, in his study of banking activity in South Carolina18 summa-
rizes basic changes in assets and liabilities of commercial banking in 
the state between 1960 and 1974. He examines the many changes in South 
Carolina's economy and banking industry, but does not discuss geograph-
ical area or patterns within the state. There are possibilities for 
this type of discussion, but the study simply points out changes in the 
banking facilities of the state. 
9 
Bank expansion, which occurred in Virginia between 1962 through 
1966 when the Buck-Holland Bill changed the banking law to permit 
statewide branching, is the subject of a study by Foster. 19 Foster 
concentrates on the ramifications of the new law and how bankers began 
to expand their business through mergers or holding companies. It seems 
that it would have aided bankers and the reader, if Foster could have 
studied areas in Virginia where bankers could expand because of the new 
law. Although it provides valuable insight into the problems of banking 
structure, the study does.not consider the geographical problems which 
the bankers in Virginia faced. 
These two articles indicate that there is a need to discuss the 
geographical aspects of banking in studies of th~s kind. Although both 
economic in nature, some geographical analysis could further contribute 
to their discussions, providing a more clear picture of present and 
future needs of the area under study. 
Because this is a study of one bank's branch system, literature 
which exists on the history of the Bank of America and its top execu-
tives should be mentioned. There was found to be much discussion of 
10 
the bank in popular periodicals from 1925 through the end of the study 
period. This is probably due to the fact that Bank of America and its 
predecessor Bank of Italy, were so sucessful in developing the state-
wide branch system in California. Hany of the articles written discuss 
current problems the bank had encountered in its development. Each new 
milestone established by the bank seemed to stir renewed interest where-
by an article would appear. 20 The periodicals provide a view of the 
policies and attitudes not available from other sources. These articles 
also provide background reference to the bank in the late 1950's and 
through the 1960's~ Two histories of the bank were found, both dating 
with the death of Bank of America's founder, A. P. Giannini. 21 
A. P. Giannini was such an influential person in the banking indus-
try, that numerous periodical articles also appear on him. 22 These 
provide an excellent source for investigation into the way he thought 
and how he developed his bank policies. Often Giannini was on the de-
fensive, and the press would get him to discuss reasons behind some of 
his policy decisions. He was assuredly an unpopular person with inde-
pendent unit bankers of the time, who felt that he was trying to gain 
control of every bank in California. In addition to these periodicals, 
there is an extensive biography of his accomplishments. 23 
Summary and Procedure 
There is a need for geographical studies on the banking industry. 
11 
Very little has been done in the way of a geographical approach to this 
area of commerce, and nothing was found ln the literature studying just 
one bank's branch system. Although much has been written on the Bank 
of America, a geographical analysis of its growth and development would 
not just add to the literature existing on the Bank of America, but add 
to the literature of the banking industry, as well as geographical lit-
erature in general. 
The additional chapters are organized in the following manner. 
Chapter II will provide a look at the founding of the bank, its poli-
cies and locations of its initial branches until 1920. Chapter III 
continues this discussion of the bank's growth, and continued geograph-
ic spread up to March, 1927. This includes discussion and locational 
data of banks merged into the system. Chapter IV looks at the final 
consolidation of the various banks into one statewide system in 1937 and 
additional growth through 1938. Chapter V looks at the period of growth 
from 1938-1970 and will summarize the study as well as make suggestions 
for further research. 
•i: 
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CHAPTER II 
FOUNDING AND INITIAL GROWTH TO 1920 
Founding 
In tracing the growth of the Bank of America and its geographical 
diffusion throughout California, it is important to understand the 
events leading up to 1904 when the bank was started as the Bank of Italy. 
To do this, a brief look into the life of its founder, A. P. Giannini is 
necessary. This provides a picture of the circumstances surrounding the 
establishment of the bank. 
A. P. Giannini was born on May 6, 1870 in San Jose, California to 
parents who had recently immigrated to the United States from Italy. 
When Giannini was seven, his father was killed and his mother remarried 
another Italian named Lorenzo Scatena, who was a strong influence in 
his stepson's life. Scatena moved his family to San Francisco, where he 
found a job in a wholesale produce company. A few years later he opened 
his own produce company, and it was there that A. P. Giannini got his 
first taste of the business world. 
When Giannini was twelve years old and attending public school, 
he also helped handle the daily receipt of produce and fruit at his 
stepfather's business. This meant that he had to get up at midnight 
each day in order that he reach the San Francisco docks before the ar-
rival of the produce boats from California's agricultural valleys. 1 
14 
After working all night, Giannini attended school for the day, atean 
early dinner and studied before going to bed. This schedule continued 
until he finished a business school course, whereupon his time was de-
voted fully to his stepfather's business. 
15 
Giannini helped the company grow and prosper in a variety of ways, 
so much so that his stepfather made him a partner at age nineteen. 
Giannini soon built the company into the largest wholesale produce com-
pany on the west coast. He did this with ingenuity and hard work, which 
soon became his trademark. He would, for example, set out for days, 
visiting hundreds of farmers in various areas of California to obtain 
their business. Giannini would explain to each, the facilities his com-
pany had to off er and emphasize that any business turned its way would 
receive the most painstaking personal attention. 2 
During these busy and successful years as a produce wholesaler, 
Giannini formed a wide acquaintance with men of all classes and races; 
also he became familiar with agricultural, horticultural and general 
business conditions of the various valleys. This provided him with the 
understanding of the needs of California's farmers and how changes in 
the agricultural market would affect them. The information gave Giannini 
valuable insight for his future banking years, and he used it to estab-
lish fair banking practices for the farmer through the Bank of Italy. 
Giannini was so successful with his wholesale business, that hav-
ing "won the fight", he lost interest in running the firm and decided to 
retire at the age of thirty one. In retirement, he discovered several 
real estate opportunities which he pursued. Soq:p. one deal led to anoth-
er and Giannin"i. became involved in the real estate business. For two 
years he was active in real estate in the predominately Italian North 
16 
Beach section of San Francisco. It is from here that a series of events 
led to his entering the banking industry. 
His father-in-law, Joseph Cuneo, who was a director and stockholder 
in the Columbus Savings and Loan Society, a small bank in San Francisco, 
died suddenly. Giannini was .named executor of the estate and, as execu-
tor, the.directorship of the bank was passed on to him.3 He accepted 
the directorship and hoped to make some long needed changes in the bank's 
operation. Giannini soon found the banks over conservative tendencies 
would rtot be easily changed •. He brought forth what he regarded as im-
portant and necessary changes before the bank directors, but they wanted 
no changes. Giannini presented one program, for example, that would 
have assisted .the small businessmen of the North Beach area, which was 
not possible under the bank's existing procedures~ 
Giannini continued to try and persuade the other directors of the 
need for adopting his suggested policy changes, but it was to no avail. 
Finding himself frustrated at every turn, a new challenge had appeared 
for Giannini -- to start a bank of his own. He would operate the bank 
on principles which the Columbus Savings and Loan Society had refused to 
adopt. Giannini resigned his directorship, gathered about him a group 
of enthusiastic young businessmen and established the Bank of Italy in 
1904. 5 
Beginning a bank, even in 1904, was no easy task for anyone to un-
dertake, especially a person with limited banking experience. Giannini 
wanted his bank to abide by an established set of policies following his 
ideas as to how a bank should be run. He state&.: 
This bank will be run solely for the benefit of its stock-
holders and depositors. No officer, including mys~lf, will 
be tied up with outside interests. It will be a clean bank 
' 
17 
run for the little fellow.6 
From these basic ideals he set about the business of forming the 
bank. His lack of banking experience proved to be an asset rather than 
a hindrance. Hi.s banking ideals as well as his procedures were proven 
to be innovative r~ther than irresponsible and reckless. 
The Bank of Italy's board of directors consisted of five directors 
who had left with Giannini from the Columbus Bank, four friends from 
his wholesale and real estate days and Giannini. Giannini found a lo-
cation suited to the board of directors, at the trfangular intersection 
of Montgomery Avenue and Columbus Avenue in the North Beach Section of 
San Francisco, for the bank's first office.7 
The bank was started with an initial capital of $l50,000, which was 
raised by selling stock at a cost of $100 a share. Giannini, from the 
beginning, wanted his ba.n:k to be owned by the largest number of stock-
holders, and hoped no one would buy more that one hundred shares. "No 
man will be permitted to win power enough to dominate its (the Bank of 
Italy) policies unwisely", he decreed •8 On October 17, 1904, the Bank 
of Italy opened its doors for business. 
Early Years of Operation 
The Bank of Italy prospered from its inception. Giannini had many 
ideas and procedures which took other bankers aback, because they were 
simply things which were not done by a "proper banker" of his day. He 
felt that if an account was worth having, one should pursue it, much in 
the same manner he obtained accounts from farmer~ in his produce days. 
He began to solicit accounts from people who had never been in a bank 
before. Many of his customers could not read or write English, so he 
had "his employees fill out all necessary forms. No account was too 
small and the bulk of his depositors were small accounts. 
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An important Bank of Italy policy initiated by Giannini, was to 
make available funds for small loans, which prior to this were looked 
at by bankers as bothersome. Before this policy was started, many 
people were. forced to go to loan sharks for small loans and pay as high 
as twenty five percent interest for the loan. Now these people could 
go to the Bank of Italy and receive a loan at six percent or seven 
percent interest. The Bank of Italy's low loan rates, and its many 
small loans were leading factors for its success. "You are putting the 
borrower out of business if you charge ten to twelve percent on loans" 
Giannini argued.9 
Two major events occurred during these early years which might 
have closed an institution of less vitality. The first was the earth-
quake and fire which destroyed most of San Francisco in 1906 and the 
second was what is known as the "panic of 1907". 
The earthquake and fire in San Francisco brought the Bank of Italy 
its first real notability. With the city on fire, and it spreading 
closer to the Bank of Italy's office, Giannini had all of the bank's 
possessions loaded onto two wagons borrowed from his stepfather's com-
pany (this included $80,000 in gold) and hauled them out to his home in 
San Mateo, seventeen miles south of San Francisco. After· the fire had 
subsided, Giannini reopened the Bank of Italy on the Washington Street 
wharf, on the San Francisco docks, with a wooden plank as a teller win-
dow and a bag of gold which had been removed eai;:,lier from the bank. The 
fire had burned down ninety five percent of the business district of San 
Francisco, including the Bank of Italy's office. 
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The Bank of Italy was able to reopen many weeks before the other 
city banks, because the other banks had to wait for their vaults to cool 
down after the fire. Giannini had the Bank of Italy's gold to put right 
in front of the customers as well as using the bank's stationery forms 
which-were also saved from the fire. It was business as usual, first 
from the Washington Street wharf, and then also from his brother's home 
on Van Ness Avenue, which was saved from the fire. With only $80,000 
in gold to cover more than $846,000 in deposits, a run on the bank could 
have easily closed it. But rather than experiencing a run, bank depos-
its went up. Residents of San Francisco needed somewhere to keep their 
money and gold safely, which before the fire, many had hidden some place 
in their homes. With no mattress to hide it under, what better place 
than in a bank, and the Bank of Italy was open. Secondly, the Bank of 
Italy had made a big impression and was able to come out of the disaster 
with more customers than ever before. 
In 1907 after all the turmoil of reconstruction of San Francisco, 
Giannini went east for a vacation and to take a look at the bank oper-
ations in New York City. New York, at the time, was (as it is now) the 
center of the banking industry in the United States. Giannini discussed 
the banking situation with a number of bankers while he was there. 
These bankers seemed to be disturbed as to what the future was going to 
bring. They were worried because even though they had plenty of good 
assets, the banks were short of real cash. Coming back to San Francisco 
Giannini had the insight to take precautions in the Bank of Italy's 
operations based on what he had learned on his tour. The year 1907 was 
to become the most distressing "money panic" known in America until 
1929 .10 
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Giannini ordered a curtailment of loans and had the Bank of Italy 
begin to pay out as much as possible in currency or silver, in order to 
hold onto as much gold as possible. Gold was thought to be a sign of 
solidness to the people of the day, and especially in California. The 
Bank of Italy's precautions paid off, because as 1907 wore on, deposits 
in all banks were quickly declining. When the panic hit San Francisco 
in full force, the Bank of Italy had the distinction of being the only 
bank in California which paid exclusively in gold coin. This further 
established the Bank of Italy's prestige and reputation, allowing it to 
continue to grow. 
Nineteen hundred and. seven was also the year that marked the Bank 
of Italy's rebuilding a new home office. It had moved from its two 
temporary sites on the wharf and at Van Ness Avenue, and set up another 
temporary home in the office of one of the directors which the fire 
missed, on Montgomery Street. The new head office was built on a site 
located at Clay and Montgomery Streets, two blocks closer than the orig-
inal office to the financial heart of San Francisco.11 The building was 
nine stories high, had a fire proof vault and it was very impressive for 
the time. It symbolized the fact that the Bank of Italy was here to 
stay. 
First Branches 
With A. P. Giannini's background established, the Bank of Italy's 
early branch system can be examined. Whereas the Bank of Italy was 
founded in 1904, it did not open its first branc~ until 1907 a~d its 
first branch outside of San Francisco until 1909. 
The Bank of Italy opened its first branch in the Mission district 
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of San Francisco in 1907. The Mission district was only a few miles 
southwest of the main office (Figure 1). It would be for over two years 
the only branch of the bank. It was, in essence, little more than 
additional teller windows for the main office. Before 1909, C~lifornia 
law said nothing about branch banking, so bankers generally operated 
only one office. As soon as the Bank Act of 1909 firmly established 
that branch banking was allowed in California, Giannini began his pro-
gram of a state wide branch bank system. As it stood in 1909, the Bank 
of Italy had just two offices -- its new home at Clay and Montgomery 
Streets and the Mission branch. 
The first branch established outside of San Francisco was at San 
Jose in October of 1909, several months after the Bank Act of 1909 went 
into effect. The policy for establishing this branch, set the preced-
ent in establishing branches in other cities for the Bank of Italy for 
the next eight years. Rather than simply going to San Jose and locat-
ing a branch where it was thought that business would be good, the Bank 
of Italy bought an established bank, keeping all of its employees, if 
possible, and then merging its resources into the branch system. The 
branch then operated under the same policies and procedures which were 
established when Giannini founded the first bank. 
There is more to the process than simply buying an established bank 
as just mentioned. The process was sometimes a complicated and round-
about procedure which had to be followed to comply with the Bank Act of 
California, which had gone into effect in early 1909. This law in many 
ways shaped the growth of branch banking in California. There were cer-
tain procedures which bankers now had to follow in order to establish a 
branch office, even if it was only a few blocks from the head office. 
Ofu.~LAND 
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* Loc-tjo~ of the first Bank of I~aly office, 1904. 
• IocRtion of the first branch (Mission), 1907. 
Figure. 1. Location of the First Bank of Italy Branch, 1907 
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The Bank Act allowed for branch banking, but had several provisions 
which affected the establishment of new branches by any California 
bank under its jurisdict:lon. The law forced the Bank of Italy (which 
was then a state bank) to develop a policy for opening the San Jose 
branch, as well as future branches, to comply with the law. The Bank 
of Italy was the pioneer in statewide branch banking and, as such, was 
without precedent. 
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The first of these provisions was that the Bank Act forbade the 
purchase of one bank's stock by another bank. To get around this law, 
the Bank of Italy set up a process whereby individuals working for the 
bank would buy the stock of the bank that was to be added to the branch 
system. The Bank of Italy in the meantime would purchase the bulk of 
the assets of the selling bank. Then, the banks would consolidate and 
in the course, the sellers' stock would be exchanged for Bank of Italy 
stock. The amount of exchange would vary, of course, to the bank being 
purchased and the time of the merger. 12 It is in this manner that the 
Bank of Italy purchased the Commercial and Savings Bank of San Jose, 
making it the first city outside San Francisco to be adopted into the 
Bank of Italy's branch bank system. 
In 1917 Giannini designed for the Bank of Italy another company 
which became known as the Stockholders Auxiliary Corporation, owned 
wholely by the bank. It served the bank in the same capacity that the 
individuals had, in buying the stock of the selling bank for the Bank 
of Italy and became what is now known as a "holding company". 
The second provision of the California Bank. Act which particularly 
effected the Bank of Italy in developing its branch system, was section 
nine, which stated: 
. • • that branch off ices may be established with the written 
approval of the superintendent of banks. He is directed to 
give such approval only when he has asserted to his satis-
faction that the puhU.c convenience and advantage will be 
promoted by the opening of such branch office.13 
This section of the law gives the superintendent of banks a great 
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deal of power, because the decision of allowing a new branch to open is 
left entirely to him. It was, therefore, to a bank's advantage to have 
a person who shared similar beliefs on banking in that office. It will 
be shown later how a superintendent who opposed the bank because he was 
against branch banking, significantly restrained the growth of the Bank 
of Italy's statewide branch bank system. 
The Bank Act of 1909 also provides that a bank that is going to 
open a branch have a certain amount of capital for each branch. A 
larger amount ?f capital was required, therefore, for any branch of the 
Bank of Italy established outside of San Francisco. Another section of 
the law, provided the basis for what is known as the "de novo rule", 
which will be discussed in the next chapter, when it is used to slow the 
Bank of Italy's branch growth by a superintendent who desired to slow 
down branch banking. All of these particular sections of the law were 
taken lightly when written, and only noticed when the Bank of Italy be-
gan its ambitious program of expansion. 
Giannini felt that a branch bank system could work for California 
as well as it had worked in Canada, which he was to use as his model. 
Some important differences from the Canadian system were made at this 
time by Giannini iµ developing the Bank of Italy's branch system. 
The Bank of Italy, rather than open all of its branches de novo, 
'-~ 
as was the general practice in Canada, preferred to enter an adopting 
community by purchasing an established bank (making for some complicated 
procedures as previously discussed). In this manner a going business 
was maintained without the problems of starting new and having to gen-
erate business. By taking over an established branch, the Bank of 
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Italy avoided being labeled as "outsiders". This was done by main-
taining the local staff, who were familiar with customers and knew of 
local problems, if any. This was a continual problem in the Canadian 
system where staffers who were brought in from Montreal or Toronto, were 
looked upon as outsiders. 'Once the Bank of Italy had established a 
system of branches, the de nova branch became much more important, be-
cause the de nova branches were generally opened in an area where a Bank 
of Italy branch was already close by. The bank thereby avoided the 
"outsider" label. It also became necessary to open branches de nova 
when fewer banks were available for purchase. 
After establishing the branch in San Jose, the geographical growth 
of the Bank of Italy was gradual. The bank always checked and re-
checked a plan before implementing it, keeping mistakes to a minimum. 
When the Bank of Italy had firmly established itself in San Francisco 
and San Jose, another branch was opened in San Mateo, by purchase of a 
bank there in 1912. Giannini then looked south to Los Angeles for the 
bank's next expansion. Los Angeles was a city on the move, growing at 
a very fast rate. Not blessed with the natural harbor that San Fran-
cisco had, the city commissioners went about constructing one, and Los 
Angeles soon became the major center for goods entering and leaving 
Southern California. 
Giannini recognized that, if the Bank of Italy was going to estab-
lish a branch bank system in California, they must have a base of 
operations Jn Los Angeles as well as San Francisco. To do this, the 
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Bank of Italy purchased the Park Bank of Los Angeles and its one branch 
in 1913. Additionally, the City and County Bank was purchased in 1913 
giving the Bank of Italy their Los Angeles branches. 
Prior to establishing the Los Angeles branches, the Bank of Italy 
had no problem in its geographical expansion. But once it jumped 400 
miles south into Los Angeles, it received immediate resentment from a 
variety of Los Angeles bankers. The Los Angeles bankers felt that San 
Francisco bankers should stay in the San Francisco economic and geo-
graphic region and they would stay in the Los Angeles region. A line 
for limiting further branch expansion, the Los Angeles bankers felt, 
should be drawn at the Tehachapi Mountain range, running basically 
east-west in central California, just south of Bakersfield (Figure 2). 
This, they felt, would give the bankers in each region, area enough to 
expand. The Bank of Italy was obviously opposed to any such thing, and 
began a long fight against it. 
The Bank of Italy also encountered a problem in Los Angeles, that 
it had not experienced in San Francisco. This was the problem of bigot-
ry against foreign immigrants. The Bank of Italy was not looked upon 
as an American institution in Los Angeles but as a bank run by foreign-· 
ers, for foreigners. There is no doubt that the Bank of Italy helped 
ethnic minorities, but it was an American institution, for all Americans. 
This label made it more difficult for the bank to grow and prosper in 
Los Angeles as it had in the San Francisco area. 
Problems, as with any new idea or system, had to be worked out and 
the Bank of Italy's branch system was no exception. In Los Angeles, the ., 
bank closed its operations of a former Park branch giving the system two 
branches in Los Angeles for a short period in 1914. With hard work, 
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Bank of Italy, 1915 
competitive operations and Ciannini's policies~ the Bank of Italy was 
soon able to ovetcome these obstacles and firmly establish itself in 
Los Angeles. 
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While maintaining the two Los Angeles branches, the Bank of Italy 
opened a branch de nova (the only one for this period) in 1915, giving 
it three branches in Los Angeles again. In 1917 the bank bought the 
International Savings Bank and merged its operations with the de nova 
branch. Further expansion in Los Angeles was years in coming, and stems 
from a change in the state superintendent of banks in 1919. The new 
superintendent held views similar to the Los Angeles bankers and favored 
regional development of branch systems. 
The problem in Los Angeles did not slow the Bank of Italy's growth 
in the San Francisco region. An additional branch in San Francisco was 
added, giving the Bank of Italy a total of eight branches and resources 
of $22,321,860 at the end of 1915J4 This gave the bank a growth of 
over $22,000,000 in just eleven years. Geographical expansion would 
continue at a moderate pace for the next five years, but the growth of 
its resources would be tremendous. The Bank of Italy was to next open 
branches in the great farming valleys of northerrt California. 
The Bank of Italy between 1915 and 1920 opened twelve branches in 
these farming valleys, where the crops varied from valley to valley. 
Such crops included grapes, raisins, beans, and citrus fruit and were in 
great demand as World War I was being fought. The valleys in which the 
Bank of It~ly established branches were as varied as their crops. 
These included the San Joaquin, the Santa Clara, the Napa and the Sanoma 
valleys _15 
It was in these locations that Giannini's policies for the bank's 
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operation really began to pay off. When he was working in his whole-
sale produce business, he had become familiar with the problems 
encountered by farmers. For many years farmers had to struggle with 
very high interest rates. Although the California farmers were at 
that time experiencing great prosperity, the high interest rates were 
still a great burden. 
When the Bank of Italy opened the first branch in the San Joaquin 
Valley at Merced in 1916, the first action that was taken was to cut 
interest rates to seven percent from the norm in the area of twelve 
percent. The bank was able to do this because of the branch system. 
It enabled the Bank of Italy to take money from all its branches and 
loan it to whatever area needed it. The unit banks which were operated 
in some of the valley towns had to depend on the resources of the local 
area. Consequently, its business would rise and fall with the local 
economy. 
The Bank of Italy, on the other hand, was drawing on resources 
from all over the state. If a crop failed in one part of the state, the 
Bank of Italy could carry the loans of that area over, supported by re-
sources from other areas of the state. Many unit banks in these small 
valley towns failed .when times were bad because they could not carry the 
loans. The Bank of Italy's branches also prospered because of its con-
tinued policy of running the bank for the "small" person. 
The Bank of Italy expanded up and down the valleys as well as in 
the San Francisco Bay area. It opened five branches in 1916, seven in 
1917 and five in 1918. Four of the new branches were opened in Oakland 
\: 
when the Bank of Italy purchased the Security Bank of Oakland in 1918. 





















during the period (Figure 3). No further geographical expansion 
occurred until mid-1921, although the Bank of Italy's resources con-
tinued to grow phenomenally. 
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At the end of 1920, the Bank of Italy had grown into a system of 
twenty five branches and held resources of $157,464,685, over 1,000 
times what it had in 1904.16 The Bank stood alone as the only bank in 
California with anything close to being a state wide branch bank system. 
From humble beginnings in San Francisco, sixteen years earlier, the 
Bank of Italy had diffused down the agricultural valleys of northern 
California and out into the San Francisco Bay area. It jumped down into 
Los Angeles to begin what would soon be another center of growth. There 
were still some problems to be worked out (especially in Los Angeles), 
but these were mainly political. The success experienced by the Bank of 
Italy in its early years will continue throughout the bank's history. 
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CHAPTER III 
EXPANSION AND GROWTH FROM 1920 TO 1927 
During the 1920's the United States was experiencing a great deal 
of new growth and prosperity. California shared iri this prosperity and 
its growth was both demographically and economically unparalled by any 
other state. Calfornia's rich agricultural valleys attracted people 
from all over the country to come and establish themselves with a new 
life. Additionally, California had two newly developing industries 
which helped its economy grow: oil and the movies. Because of these 
three factors, California, which was ranked twenty-second among states 
in population when the Bank of Italy was founded, had moved to sixth 
by the mid-1920's. Although all California shared in the growth, South-
ern California and Los Angeles were the center for much of it. 
The conditions of enormous population growth as well as continuing 
economic prosperity, made an ideal situation for expansion of the Bank 
of Italy's branch bank system. In 1919 the Bank became the first to 
join the Federal Reserve System which began in 1913. The Bank of Italy 
continued to expand its branch bank system as well as its deposits and 
resources. It grew from the twenty-five branches and resources of 
$i50,000,000 in 1920 to a system of 275 branches and resources of 
$600,000,000 on March 1, 1927, the day the Bank o,f Italy became a na-
tional bank.l Once again, much of the bank's phenomenal success during 




Restrained Growth under Superintendent Stern's Administration 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Bank of Italy did not ex-
perience any branch growth from 1919 to mid-1921. The years 1919 to 
June 1921 mark the years when Charles F. Stern was California's State 
Superintendent of banks. Stern was opposed to branch banking when he 
entered office. lie felt that branch banking was monopolistic and was 
driving the independent unit banker out of business. Stern also be-
lieved that if there was to be branch banking, that the bank operating 
the branches should be "in territory with a close economic relationship 
with the home office". 2 
This meant that if a bank was going to have branch banking, it 
would be regional branch banking, geographically limited to the region 
north or south of the Tehachapi Line. Although the Bank of Italy had 
branches south of the Tehachapi Line, it would be slowed in any further 
expansion. Stern was opposed to any statewide branch banking, even 
though it was perfectly legal in California as established by the Bank 
Act of 1909. It was not until the middle part of 1921 that the Bank of 
Italy received a permit to add another branch to its banking system any-
where in California. 
During this period, the Bank of Italy continued to acquire banks 
through the Stockholders Auxiliary Corporation, operating them as inde-
pendent banks (but using the Bank of Italy's operating procedures). In 
this manner the Bank of Italy bought eight banks, but had to wait to add 
them to their branch system until they could convince Stern that the 
"public convenience and advantage" would be promoted by the opening of 
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an additional Bank of Italy branch. 
Even though it was known that Stern was anti-branch banking when he 
entered office, the Bank of Italy, as well as other California branch 
bankers, pursued Stern trying to change his thinking. About one year 
after he had taken off ice, Stern finally conceded that branch banking 
was not what he had thought it to be, and he began issuing permits to. 
allow new branch banks to open. To various banks in the Los Angeles 
area he issued a large number of permits, all of which were in the Los 
Angeles region south of the Tehachapi Line. None were issued to the 
Bank of Italy, the leader of branch banking in the state. 
Giannini recognized what was going on and decided to strengthen his 
present branch system, and wait out the situation before taking any le-
gal action. The break came in April, 1921 when a unit bank in Visalia 
was on the verge of closing. Giannini was the only banker at the time 
in a position to save it from closing. Stern wanted the Bank of Italy 
to purchase the bank through the Stockholders Auxiliary Corporation, but 
Giannini refused, stating the Bank of Italy would only move in if the 
unit bank was converted into a branch. Stern had no choice and issued 
the permit for the branch in April, 1921. 
Los Angeles area bankers had finally recognized the benefits of 
branch banking and began acquiring many more new branches. They had no 
desire to leave the Los Angeles region and wanted no "outsiders" from 
San Francisco competing for the region's business. Becuase they held 
the basic view shared by Stern on branch banking, Stern issued them 
branch permits without much hesitation, but effe,f tively hemmed in the 
Bank of Italy in any further geographical growth in the Los Angeles 
region. 
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Stern resigned in June of 1921 to become vice-president of the Los 
Angeles Trust and Savings Bank -- a bank which he had issued a number of 
branch permits to and a rival of the Bank of Italy in Los Angeles. This 
could explain his resistance toward the Bank of Italy's continued branch 
expansion during his tenure as superintendent. He did though, as a 
final gesture, grant the Bank of Italy eight branch permits (the eight 
banks being operated as independents by the Stockholders Auxiliary Cor-
poration, none of which were south of the Tehachapi Line) before 
resigning. This gave the Bank of Italy a branch bank system of thirty 
four branches as of July 1921. Of these thirty-four,only four were 
south of the Tehachapi Line. It was at this same time that the Bank of 
Italy moved its head office from Clay and Montgomery Streets to No. 1 
Powell Street, San Francisco. 
The Do9ge Years 
With the resignation of Stern, Jonathan S. Dodge became the new 
superintendent of banks in California. It should be recognized after 
the Stern years as superintendent, how much power the Bank Act of 1909 
gave the man in that office over the growth of a branch bank system. 
With the advent of Dodge into the office of superintendent, the Bank of 
Italy was confronted with yet another obstacle in its building of a 
statewide branch bank system. 
When Dodge became superintendent, Giannini felt that he might 
restrict the Bank of Italy's branch growth, much as Stern did as super-
intendent. But Dodge was fairly liberal in granting approval to 
' 
permits submitted by the Bank of Italy for new branches. Before 1921 
was out, Dodge had approved seventeen new branches and granted Gi.annini 
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permission to organize a new bank known as the Liberty Bank. Only two 
of these branches were south of the Tehachapi Line; one in San Diego and 
one in Shafter. 
Although the permits were issued quickly by the state superintend-
ent of banks, these new branches were slowly added to the system. The 
Bank of' Italy was a member of the Federal Reserve (since 1919), and as 
such, subject to the rulings imposed by its board. The Federal Reserve 
Board had been taking a second look at branch banking, expecially in 
California. Prior to th€ fall of 19 21, the Federal Res Erv€ Boe.rd was 
quick to approve all applications it received for a new branch. After 
19 21, howE·ver, they wanted to slow down branch banking, and thus were 
slow in approving new applications to all member California banks, 
especially the Bank cf Italy. 
The additional branches established by the Bank of Italy in 1921 
started a new geographical pattern for expansion. In the earlier years, 
the Bank of Italy established itself up and down California's agri-
cultural valleys and in Los Angeles. The Bank of Italy was now (1921) 
establishing branches in any town or city where an independent unit bank 
or small branch system (which was financially sound), became available 
for purchase (although they still had trouble, as with Stern, getting 
permfts for branches south of the Tehachapi Line). In a city where a 
bank simply could not be purchased, the Bank of Italy would, on occa-
sion, apply to open a branch de novo. Giannini, as mentioned in the 
previous chapter, had tried to avoid opening a branch de novo in the 
early years of the bank, found it" necessary to apply for more and more 
de nova permits, as banks available for purchase became much fewer in 
number. 
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The Federal Reserve felt that the Bank of Italy was expanding too 
rapidly for its own good, and as a consequence, had slowed down the 
approval of branch penr.its. Superintendent Dodge, after· researching 
the Bank of Italy fully, also decided that the; Bank of Italy was ex-
panding too fast and in too many areas, and wanted also to slow them 
down. Another problem was that t·odge was being pressured by California's 
independent unit bankers to slow down the branch bankers. They felt 
that branch banking (the way Superintendent Stern felt in 1919) was 
monopolistic and should be halted. Dodge concluded from his study that 
branch banking cc·uld continue, so long as r,ot to continue to drive inde-
pendent unit bankers out of business. He felt that this was being done, 
not by the purchasing of said unit banks, but by the cpening of de nova 
branches. He, therefore, devised the "de ncvo rule" as a compromise 
to slow down the Bank of Italy's agressive branch banking policies and 
to appease the independent unit bankers. 
What the ·rule said was: 
No branch of any bank shall be created in any locality other 
than city cf locality in \\'hich is located the principle place 
of business of such bank except by purchase of, or consolida-
tion or merger with an existing bank in such city or locality 
in which it is desired to create or establish such branch bank 
unless the superintendent of banks in his discretion shall find 
that the public convenience end advantage reql'.ire it. 3 
This meant tr.at the Bank of Italy cculd only establish a de nova 
branch in S&n Francisco, otherwise it would have to buy a bank already 
in existence. Dodge would make exceptions (as he d.id in Sacramento 
for the Bank of Italy in 1921) after the rule went into effect, but 
these would be few. This rule did not effect t~e Bank of Italy greatly 
c!t first, because it WE;S already the Bank of Italy's practice to buy an 
established bank for its branch. But the new rule did mean a rejection 
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of two de nova permits at the time of the ruling (in San Pedro and Santa 
Maria), and as we shall see, many in the future. 
The de: nova rule as a consequence did two other things which effec-
ted the Bank of Italy's branch growth. First it set a precedent for the 
Federal Reserve Board in granting branch permits to its rr.ember banks. 
The Federal ReE'.erve Board in 1922 began to follow tr.e de nova rule to 
slow cown branch banking, much in the way Dodge used it. Secondly, it 
became an advantage to the Los Angeles branch bankers. There were at 
the time seven banks in Los Angeles e.ngaged in branch bankin~, all of 
which could continue to expand de nova whereas the Bank of Italy could 
not. This was a time when there was a boom expansion in Los Angeles, 
and the Los Angeles bankers could take edvantage of it. The Bank of 
Italy could not, and was confined to de nova expansion in San Francisco 
where the population had changed very little during the same time period. 
ThE: only wzy for the Bank of Italy to expand further, was to have its 
Stockholders Auxiliary or another holding company buy an establis~ed 
bank, whicr as we shall see, Giannini did with great skill. 
While the Bank of Italy slowly continued to deYelop its branch bank 
system by buying bankE:, Giannini had organized in 1921, the Liberty 
Bank, whose head office was located in the old Bank of Italy headquE".r-
ters at Clay and Montgomery. The bank was to be cc·ntrolled by a holding 
company based out of New York City, known as Bancitaly Corporation. It 
differed from the Bank of Italy only in that the name was spelled with a 
"c" instead of a "k". The major stockholders WE:re the same as the Bank 
of Italy, but Bancitaly would have the Liberty Bank do two things dif-,, 
ferently.4 
First, Liberty Bank's officers and directors (those out front) all 
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had non-Italian names such as Hale, Miller and Webster, making it seem 
totally apart from the Bank of Italy, but in reality controlled and run 
by Giannini and his Bank of Italy policies. 5 Secondly, it would not be 
a member of the Federal Reserve and, therefore, only responsible to the 
state superintendent of banks. 
The Liberty Bank becamE": much more important to Gianr.ini than the 
Bank of Italy branch bank system in the next few years. Wherever the 
Bank of Italy was denied a branch north of thE Tehachapi Line, because 
of a Federal Reserve Board ruling or a ruling against expansion by the 
superintendent of banks, Giannini simply had the Liberty Bank submit an 
application. In this manner, hE: avoided the Federal Reserve Board, and 
the state superintendent usually granted the application the second time 
around. Giannini went to all the trouble becc-.use he c.esired the Bank of 
Italy to remain in the Federal RE'.Serve 8ystem. Even with the anti-
branch stand it y;as taking, Giannini felt it was to the Bank of Italy's 
advantage to keep the Federal Reserve system strong. Having the Bank of 
Italy suddenly drop out of thE: Federal Reserve, might have disastrous 
effects on the system, especially in California. 
In 1922 the Bank of Italy managed to add twenty new branches to its 
system (eight of those in the Los Angeles region) giving it a total of 
seventy-one branches, doubling the number of branches l.t had when Dodge 
entered office; This was still less than Giannini hc;.d planned on if the 
Bank of Italy had not been slowed in :!ts natural expansion. Dodge re-
signed as superintendent in January 1923, leaving behind him an office 
even more powerful than i-'hen he had entered. 
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Branch Growth between 1923 and January 1927 
In the period between 1923 and March, 1927, branch banking grew at a 
phenomenal rate. It was during this period that Giannini succeeded in 
putting together the first large statewide branch bank system, even 
though many people tried to limit him and the Bank of Italy. 
With the resignation of Dodge as superintendent of banks, J. Frank-
lin Johnson became the new superintendent. Johnson, like Dodge, was an 
advocate of limiting branch banking to north or south regions. But, un-
like his predecessor, Johnson was not deluged with a number of branch 
applications as he first entered office. The few which the Bank of Italy 
applied for at this time were approved by Johnson, but when they came be-
fore the Federal Reserve Board for approval, the applications were rejected. 
Anti-branch bankers had won control of the Federal Reserve Board 
in late 1922 and they were out to put an end to the Bank of Italy's 
branch hanking. The Board adopted a set of rules which were clearly 
aimed at the Bank of Italy in an attempt to restrict its continued 
branch growth. New branches were eventually allowed into the Bank of 
Italy's branch system, but at an artificially slow rate. By June of 
1924 the Bank of Italy had 88 branches in 57 different cities. One 
year later there were 95 branches in 65 cities. 6 These figures would 
have been much higher if the Bank of Italy had been allowed to con~ 
tinue to grow at the rate Giannini had planned. 
In addition to the slowing down and rejections in Washington by the 
Federal Reserve Board, the Bank of Italy could not get Johnson to 
~ - ) 
;1pprov0 any more branch applications south of the Tehachapi Line other 
than the nineteen they had as of June, 1925. Recognizing that the Bank 
of Italy was going to be locked out at every point from any further 
branch expansion in the South, Giannini had be:en 1•reparing since 1923 
a series of moves which culminated in the union of five major branch 
banks into one Etatew:ide branch system. 
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Giann:1.ni' s first move was early in 1923 when he moved the corporate 
headquarters of Bancitaly (the holding company) from New York City to 
Los Angeles making it a Los Angeles region business. This :i.s the same 
company which controlled the Liberty Bank. He then had Bancitaly buy 
the Commercial National Bank of Los Angeles, in March, 1923. Giannini 
used Bancitaly in this purchase because the Federal Re.serve Board had 
recently ruled that the Bank of Italy's hold~_ng company, Stockholders 
Auxiliary, could nc·t buy any bc:.nkE in California without itE. approval, 
which it would not give. 
When Bancitaly bought Commercial National, it had only three 
branches a.nd $11, 000, 000 in deposits. Giannini quickly began having 
Commercial National operate as if it were the Bank of Italy and, in 
1924, changed the bank's name to the Commercial National Trust and 
Savings Association. It soon began an aggressive branching policy that, 
by 1926, Commercial National Trust and Savings Associatj_on had twenty 
branches (Figure 4) and over $21,000,000 in deposits. Because 
Commercial N.T.S.A. operated only within Los Angeles, the Federal Re-
serve Board (of which it was a member) had no cr.oice under its own rul-
ings hut to grant branch applications as approved and forwarded by 
Superintendent .Johnson. The latter approved the applications because 
they did not violate any banking regulations and did not involve cross-
ing north of the Teh;;,chapi Line. Giannini now planned to buy an es-
tablished state b;mk without Fee.era! Re.serve membership to do what 
Commercial N.T.S.A. could not do ..• expand outside Los An~eles. 
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Giannini formed another hc0lding company called Americomm.ercial (to 
which he divested control of Commercial N.T.S.A.) and it became a sub-
sidiary of Bancitaly. In other words, a hclding company, controlling a 
holding company, which controlled the bank. Giannini felt that this 
complicated power structure would put him e.nd the Bank of Italy far 
enough out of the picture as to avoid any prejudices held against him 
and the Bank of Italy. It also made it seem that all three t.ranch sys-
terns (Bank of Italy, Liberty Bank and Commercial N.T.S.A.) were being 
operated entirely seperate from each other, bet in reality, controlled. 
by Giannini. It was indeed a roundabout way to achieve his goal of a 
statewide branch bank Eystem, but the only way to do it at the time. 
Once Americommercial was established, Giannini had it negotiate to 
buy the Bank of America, Los Angeles, a sound state branch bank system 
withc·ut Federal Reserve membership. The Bank of America, Los· Angeles, 
was organized by Orra Monnette in 1923 in I.os Angeles. It based all of 
its bc.nking policies or. those developed by Giannini and the: Bank of 
Italy. The Bank of America, Los Angeles, grew rapidly in its first 
year, having eight branches in and around Los Angeles. Because it was 
a state bank a.nd not a member of the Fede,ral Reserve, the Bank of 
Amer:i.ca could expand its branch system outside cf Los Angeles. Super-
intendent Johnson issued it permits for its new branches because it was 
a financially sound bank and none of the, applications for branches were 
/ 
north cf the Tehachapi Line. 
In mid-1924, Americommerci.al was successful in purchasing control 
of the Bank of America, Los Angeles, adding its ~ight branches and 
16,000 depositors to its system. With the purchase, Orra Monnette was 
made president of Americomm.erci.al. From this position, Monnette was 
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hired to direct the two banks' progress, keeping them separate in their 
operations, but using the same established policies he acquired from the 
Bank of Italy. Keeping the banks separate, Giannini, through Ameri-
commercial, control led. two rapidly growing branch systems south of the 
Tehachapi Line, one under Federal and State jurisdiction and the other 
under just state jurisdiction. The Bank of America, Los Angeles, was to 
grow from its eight branches when purchased by Americonnnercial, to a 
system of twenty-five branches in and around Los Angeles by 1926, reach-
ing from Santa Barbara in the north to Anaheim in the south (Figure 5). 
By the end of 1926, the two banks had fifty-five branches and over 
$60,000,000 in dep9sits between them.7 
In California's other major city, San Diego, Giannini had not at-
tempted to enter this market area to the degree he had in Los Angeles. 
The Bank of Italy and Giannini's other two banks in the south had only 
one branch there (a Bank of Italy branch) at the end of 1926. Although 
San riego had not experienced the rapid boom that Los Angeles had dur-
ing this period, it was still a valuable market to establish branches 
in. This was being done by George W. Davidson with the Southern Trust 
and Commerce Bank of San Diego. He entered Southern Trust into branch 
banking in 1920 and by the end of 1921 there were five branches all 
outside of San Diego. By 1926 the system added four more new branches, 
giving the Southern Trust nine branches in and around San Diego (Figure 6). 
In early January, 1927, Giannini had Bancitaly negotiate and buy 
the Southern Trust and its branch system, giving him control of three 
major branch bank systems south of the Tehachapi Line. These three 
'· 
banks had branches ranging from Santa Barbara in the north and now all 
















Figure 6. Southern Trust and Commerce Bank of San Diego, 1926 
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in the south. Of the Commercial N.T.S.A., Bank of America, Los Angeles 
and the Southern Trust, not one had a branch north of the Tehachapi 
Lint•. 
As all this.development was occurring in Southern California, the 
P.ank of Italy had been successfully slowed to a stop with its branch 
expansion by the Federal Reserve Board. Only one branch was added be-
tween June, 1925 and Junuary, 1927. This gave the Bank of Italy 
ninety-six branches and resources of over $450,000,000 at the end of 
1926. 8 Only nineteen of thes€ branches, as previously mentioned, were 
south of the Tehachapi Line (Figure 7). 
The fact that the Bank of Italy did not have much branch expansion 
in the years 1924-1927 is a bit deceptive, because as mentioned earlier, 
what branch expansion Giannini could not achieve with the Bank of Italy, 
he did with Commercial N.T.S.A. or Bank of America, Los Angeles, in the 
south or continued the branch expansion in the north with the Liberty 
Bank. 
The Liberty Bank had grown from its modest beginnings in 1921 to a 
system of fifteen branches and $17,000,000 in deposits in 1925. 9 In 
the next year it doubled its branch bank system by adding seventeen new 
branches, giving the Liberty Bank a total of thirty-two branches, all 
north of the Tehachapi Line (Figure 8). Many of the cities where the 
Liberty Bank expanded were cities Giannini haµ hopes of opening a branch 
of the Bank of Italy ... but could not because of the rules imposed on it 
by the Federal Reserve Board. As we will see, it really did not matter 
to Giannini which.bank opened up a new branch, because he was planning 
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Consolidation (January, 1927-March, 1927) 
The merr,er of the five branch bank systems ccntrolled by Giannini. 
into or.e statewide system under the Bank of Italy banner, took place: in 
two major steps. The first step was the: merging of the three eouthern 
banks ( Commr:rd.al N. T. S. A. , Bank of America, Los Angeles and Southern 
Trust and Commerce Bank, San Diego) with the northern system of the 
Liberty Bank. This first step wes possible because of two events which 
occurred in late 1926 and early 1927. 
The first was a change in the state superintendent of banks. 
JohnEon who served under Governor Friend Richardson and was totally 
agaj_nst any stateiddc, branch bank system, lost his job when Richardson 
lost reelection as governor in the fall of 1926. The winning governor, 
ClemE:nt C. Youn~., appointed Will C. Wood as the new superintendent cf 
hanks in January, 1927 (when Johnson's term was officially ended). Wood 
was just the c·pposite of Johnson and firmly believec1. that statewide 
branch banking was a good thing for California. 10 
Secondly, the Federal Reserve· Board had eased its rulings somewhat 
because of a few new board members and e. bill which was pending in Con-
gress. The name cf this law was the McFadden Act, and it would take 
much of the burde-·n off of the Federal Reserve Board by making law many 
of the rulings the Bc.ard had made in the past, limiting the growth of 
branch banking. What the law s2,id basically was that any national bank 
or state bank with Federal Reserve membership could establish new 
branches (purchased or de nova) only in the city where its parent bank 
was located. A bank could maintain any branches outside its home city 
which it was ope:rating whe:n the bill became law. 11 
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State banks, not members cf the Federal Reserve, could therefore 
still establish branch banks outside of their home city de noYo or by 
purchasing anothE.r bc:.nk and then merge it into its system. The 
Mc Fad cl en Act applied only to nationc-.1 banks or Federal Reserve member 
state banks. The law allowing state banks to continue branch banking 
I 
was net important to Giannini at the moment because he wanted his sys-
tern to be: a member of the. Federal Reserve and a national bank. But, as 
we shall see later, this was a very important loophole which Giannini 
used to full advantage. Voting, debate and revisions were being fought 
over in Congress en the McFadden Act for most of the fall of 19Z6. 
During the first two months of 1927, passage seemecl. very close:, there-
fore, i.f Giar-.nini wc::nte<l to create his state\dde system of branch l::anks 
as a national bad~ and member of the Federal Reserve, time wns of the 
es£ence. 
With the two events just discussed giving Giannini an opening, 
matters moved with dramatic swiftner:s in January and Februc:.ry, 1927. 
For the first time in ten years, Giannini had the cooperation of the 
state superintender.t of banks in Wood. He alsc had. a more relaxed and 
favorable Federal REserve P.oard to work wj.th. Wood, after tv;o weeks in 
office, approvf:.d the merger of the three southern bc:.nks with the Liberty 
Bank. The Federal Reserve Board, because of Commercial N.T.S.A. 's 
membership. also had to give its consent. It did so becuase of the new 
membership on the l::oard and because the new Eystem would join the 
Fed<:'.ra] Reserve. The four banks l::ec2.me kno"m as the. Liberty Bank of 
America as the merger wc:·s approved on January 28, 1927. "The policies 
v.:-hich hc:.ve mad€: thE: Liberty Bank in the north and the: Bank of .America in 
thE· south successful will be: continued with the consolidated institu-· 
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,,51 b tion, · Monnette was to sa.y as thE new branch bad~ systEm Egan oper-
at ion. 
The LibE:rty Bank of A1m~rica wa.s a system of 136 branch banks 
( $ 13 _state,dde Figure 9), and with rescurces of more than 200,000~000. 
As mentioned earlier, noting the loophole in the McFadden A.ct (which 
was to pass very soon), Giann:i.ni had the foresight not to merge every 
branch which the banks controlled into the new Liberty Bank of America. 
Giannini rEta5_ned thE: Bank of America, Los Angele::, state charter. and 
maintained three cf its branches as simply the Bank of Americe, and 
kept it out of the Fec:1eral Reserve system. This is an important move 
"'hich virtually nc onE besides Gj_anninj recognized and w:i.11 be dis-
cussed jn detail in the next chapter. 
Giannini controlled. two major branch bank systems in California: 
The Bank of Italy with most of its ninety six brancl:es in the north 
and the Liberty Bank of Americe which l:.ad its 136 branches statewide. 
Giar,nini 1 s second step ·wz.s to merge these ti;rn systems under one name. 
ThE details of thE: formation of the LibE:rty Bank of America ha.d 
harely bE·en made public when the merger of thE Bank of Italy and the 
eewl y created LihE:rty Bank of Amc:rica wzs announced. Both these banks 
had virtually the same stockholde:rs, controlling the majority of stock 
and hoth being directEd by Giannini and his banking policies. Under 
the conE.ent of both the state superintendent of banks ar..d the Federal 
Reserve Board (for virtually the same ree.sons they granted creation cf 
the Liberty Eank of Americe.) the Bank of Italy a.bscrbEd the Liberty 
Bank of Americ2 on February 18, 1927. 
ThE· sanction of such a merger was justifiec:1 by Wood at the time-: in 
the following statement~ 
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Liberty Bank of America, 1927 
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In deciding to approve the agreement of purchase and sale, I 
took into consideration the fact that both the Bank of Italy 
and the Liberty Bank of America are owned by the same people 
and are all but technically under the same general manage-
ment. Bankers generally agree that it is neither good bank-
ing policy nor good public policy to keep the banks separate 
in operation when the ownership is practically identica1.14 
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With that, the Bank of Italy became the largest bank in the United 
States outside of New York with resources of nearly $650,000,000. The 
Bank of Italy had a system of 276 branches (forty-four branches had 
been added by absorbing independents controlled by each through their 
holding companies, or added de novo, before the merger) extending from 
the Oregon line to the Mexican border (Figure 10). 
Undoubtedly, the reason for the rapid mergers lay in the desire by 
Giannini to have the Bank of Italy remain in the Federal Reserve and 
complete the statewide branch bank system under one banner before the 
McFadden Act became law. The Act was passed on February 25, 1927, just 
one week after the merger of the Bank of Italy and the Liberty Bank of 
America was completed. The Bank of Italy had made application to become 
a national bank in early February. On March 1, 1927, the application was 
approved thereby creating the Bank of Italy National Trust and Savings 
Association. Many thought that the Bank of Italy N.T.S.A. would only 
add branches in San Francisco, but with Giannini's understanding of the 
loophole in the McFadden Act, this was not to he. 
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CHAPTER IV 
BOON - DEPRESSION - RECOVERY -- 1927-1938 
During the period between :March, 1927, and October, 1929, California 
continued to experience enormous growth and "Coolidgen prosperity. Many 
people were making fortunes in the stock market buying on margin (pay-
in~ only ten percent of the stock's price, borrowing the difference 
and using the stock as collateral). In October, 1929, the stock market 
crashed all around them.· The stock market crash pulled the country into 
the worst depression in history. It took almost a decade for recovery. 
In California, problems had been troubling the agricultural section 
of the economy throughout the last half of the 1920's. Even with the 
diverse crop production, the agricultural industry was to suffer tre-
mendously. Overproduction and unreliable markets were the major cause 
of the dilemma. The depression brought on new problems for the farmers, 
especially in the Central Valley, where conditions remained critical as 
the rest of .the state began to recover in the mid-1930 1 sJ 
The Central Valley's problems were compounded by an influx of 
people, because California was still looked upon as the land of oppor-
tunity for many people, es~ecially those from the mid-west. Farmers 
left their farms in the "dust bowl" heading for California and better 
times. What they found was not much better and is brought to life by 
ti 
John Steinbeck's novel, .The._ Grapes_ of Wr~th. As national economic con-
ditions began to improve, markets began to reappear, bringing back 
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prosperity to Californias agricultural industry. 
The other parts of California suffered along with the rest of the 
country until Hoosevelt entered off ice and get the country back on the 
road to recovery with "the New Deal". One bright spot which should be 
mentionec, is the movie indestry. America, even in the depression, had 
to be entertained and Southern California was the center for the enter-
tainment industry. Hollywood was still turning out films, and this 
provided many jobs and was a great asset to the economy in the Southern 
California area. 
The Bank of Italy reached a high point and a low point during this 
period. Giannini put together another branch bank system similar to 
the Liberty Bank of America, merging them into one system. Then, be-
cause of mismanagement by subordinates, he almost lost it all. Through 
the boom and bust years of 1927 to 1938 the Bank of Italy (presently to 
become the Bank of America) emerged stronger tha.n ever under the renewed 
leadership of A. P. Giannini. 
After the merger which completed Giannini's plan for thE Bank of 
Italy N.T.S.A., prior to the passage of the McFadden Act in February 
1927, many financial experts felt that the Bank of Italy would be limit-
ed to San Francisco in future branch growth. For example, Southworth, 
in a study of branch banking in the United States in 1928, stated, "It 
would now appear that the Bank of Italy has now reached its final form 
under pre8ent legislation. 11 2 What Southworth and many other banking 
authorities did not see, and Giannini did, was a loophole in the 
McFadden Act which could be used to continue branch bank expansion. 
The McFadden Act (as mentioned in Chapter III) stated that a na-




of the two merging banks was located in the same city. The merging 
banks could retain any branches they were operating prior to the passage 
of the McFadden Act and could only open de novo branches in their home 
clty. Thfi:; law, it was felt, would severely limit branch bank expansion 
statewide. But Giannini saw a loophole which he could use to continue 
branch expansion, much in the same rattern as his formation of the 
Liberty Bank of America as described in Chapter III. 
The key is being able to merge with another bank, so long as the 
head offices are located in the same city. Giannini simply started 
forming the new branch system by buying a bank with an established 
branch system and bcilding on to it, leaving the Bank of Italy out of 
the picture until he was ready to merge the two systems. 
Another important point is what the McFadden Act does not say. 
Giannini recognized that the McFadden Act could only be applied to 
national banks or state banks which were members of the Federal Reserve. 
It said nothing about state banks without Federal Reserve membership or 
anything on holding companies operating state banks. Giannini used 
these three devices to put together the Bank of America, California in 
just one and one half years. 
Giannini began in April 1927 with the acquisition of the United 
Bank and Trust Company of California. This bank, with its head office 
in San Francisco, had a branch system of eight branches in 1923, located 
from Sacramento, in the north, to Fresno in the south (Figure 11). 3 
By 1927 it had not added any additional branches, but United Bank had 
built its resources to $49,000,000. Giannini had purchased the United 
" 
Bank with a holding company known as the French-American Corporation. 






Figure 11. United Bank and Trust, 1923 
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Bank was purchased in 1924 by Bancitaly Corporation. Giannini purposely 
left the French-American Bank out of the merger of the Liberty Bank and 
the three southern banks he controlled when the Liberty Bank of America 
was formed in 19Z7. The French-American was a state bank without Feder-
al Reserve membership, therefore responsible only to California's state 
superintendent of banks. Giannini wanted a state bank operating north 
of the Tehachapi Line to match with the Bank of America which operated 
south of the line. Giannini left nothing to chance .•. if there was to be 
a sudden change in the state superintendent of banks, he wanted to be 
prepared to continue branch expansion on a zonal basis. 
French-American Corporation controlled both the United Bank and the 
French-'American Bank. With the purchase of .the United Bank~ he merged 
the two operations together under the United Bank's name. This added 
five new branches to the United Bank branch system, giving it thirteen 
branch~s, five of which were located in San Francisco (Figure 12), and 
reeources well over $73,000,000. 
The abovE· described merger was critical in Giannini's plan of a new 
statewide branch bank system. The United Bank was a member of the 
Federal Reserve and, therefore, came under the rules of the McFadden Act. 
If Washington did not approve of the merger, the loophole would be 
closed or a legal battle would ensue. It also removed the French-Ameri-
can Bank from state operations, leaving Giannini no state bank north of 
the Tehachapi Line. Giannini did not want to bring to light his latest 
plans, which would have happened had the merger been disapproved by the 
Federal Reserve. He would have to withdraw the United Bank from the 
I• 
Federal Reserve to continue its branch expansion (and have a state bank 
north of Tehachapi). At the moment he was not ready to do this. When 
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Figure 12. United Bank and Trust, 1927 
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no objections came, a precedent had been eoStablished and Giannini knew 
he could merge the United Bank with the Bank of Italy whenever he was 
ready. However, he had a lot more branch expansion he wanted to 
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achieve before doing so. He also wanted to avoid attention - preventing 
anyone from blocking his plans -- until he was satisfied with the rew 
system. 
Giannini was content with United Bank's progress in the number of 
branches it had, concentrating on building up its resources. He next 
turned to the French-American Corporation to continue purchasing banks, 
leaving the United Bank c·ut of the picture, just for the moment. In 
this way he kept the newly purchased banks out of the Federal Reserve, 
yet the United Bank in ••• again avoiding attention. 
In September 1927, Giannini decided that he would start another 
branch bank system of just state banks, none of which were Federal 
Reserve banks, from some of the banks the French-Americe.n had recently 
purchased (it must be remembered that these were boom times and money 
was readily available for such purchases). Giannini submitted applica-
tions to the state superintendent of banks to merge three of the 
independents (and the few branches each was running) and form a new 
bank. Each bank had the name Security in its title, therefore, he 
called the bank Security Bank & Trust with its head off ices in Bakers-
field. 4 
After approval of its charter by Superintendent Wood, the Security, 
Bakersf:leld, began to rapidly expand its branch bank system throughout 
California by adding banks which had been purcha~ed by the French-
American Corporation. By January 1928, the branch system had rapidly 
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Fi gun' 1 3. Security Bank and Trust of Bakersfield, 1928 
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Security, Bakersfield branches were located mainly in the rural sec-
tions of California. It was here Giannini was able to establish new 
branches because local unit bankers were having problems relating to the 
local agricultural misfortunes of the late 1920's. It was as before, 
unit hanks' prosperity would rise and fall with the local economy. 
Superinter.dent Wood was pleased to see a Giannini branch move into the 
stricken areas, bringing back some confidence to the local economy. It 
was another example ~;upporting the basic Giannini ideas about branch 
banking and the good it could bring into California's agricultural 
areas. 
As with the Bank of Italy after 1920, Security,Bakersfield did not 
expand in any discernible geographical pattern other than concentrating 
its branch expansion in the rural areas rather than thE: urban areas of 
Northern California. Branch expansion in the south was again being lim-
ited to a Giannini hank. This time it was not by a state superintendent 
of banks enforcing the zonal theory of branch banking, but a legal 
battle with a Los Angeles bank over the use of the word "security" in 
its name. The Los Angeles bank won a court injunction limiting further 
branch growth of Security,Bakersfield in the Los Angeles area because of 
its name. 
The Security,Bakersfield continued its branch expansion in the 
north by merging banks it purchased or merging in French-American Corpo-
rat:i.on independents that were eligible into its system. It was expanding 
almost exactly as the Liberty Bank had two years earlier. This time 
around it was easier for Giannini because he had the support of Super-
intendent Wood in Security,Bakersfield's branch expansion program. 
For the next six months - on into 1928 -- Security, Bakersfield and 
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the French-American Corporation continued to purchase unit banks wherev-
er one (which Giannini or his associates wanted to acquire) became 
available. In January 1928, Giannini decided it was time to combine the 
branches and resources of the United Bank with the Security, Bakersfield. 
To do so required Giannini to withdraw the United Bank from the Federal 
Reserve. He did this as to avoid problems with the Washingto,n author-
ities because of the McFadden Act. It also laid bare his latest plans 
in cor_tinued branch expansion. It additionally created two branch sys-
terns, just as before, one under federal and state authority and one 
under just state authority. Giannini was able to withdraw the United 
Rank from the Federal Reserve System without any serious repercussions 
from the Federal Reserve, as migrt have happened earlier if he had with-
drawn the Bank of Italy. 
With the merger, Giannini movecl. Security, Bakersfield head office 
into United Bank's head office in San Francisco and renamed the bank 
Security Bank and Trust of San Francisco. He did this so that he could 
still merge the Security, San Francisco into the Bank of Italy whenever 
he was ready and still comply completely with the McFadden Act. At 
that time Giannini was not ready to stop branch expansion with Security, 
San Francisco. The new bank was a system of forty-nine branches in 
5 California (Figure 14) and resources over $100,000,000. 
branches were located in the Los Angeles region. 
Only three 
Two months later Giannini negotiated and purchased the Rumbolt 
Bank of San Francisco. The Rumbolt Bank did not have a large branch 
bank system (only three branches - all located in San Francisco), but 
I· 
it did have ever $30,000,000 in resoerces. 6 Giannini was not concerned 































Francisco by building its resources. This also gave him the opportunity 
to change the name of the bank slightly to United Security Bank and 
Trust, hoping to end the court injunction, but this proved to be to no 
avail. The merger gave United Security resources over $140,000,000 and 
fifty-three branches. 7 The court's injunction which limited the ~ank's 
expansion in the Los Angeles region dictated to Giannini that any fur-
ther expansion geographically into the ·south would have to be similar to 
the approach he took by acquiring the Commercial N.T.S.A., et al, as 
discussed in Chapter III. 
Before exami.ning the southern expansion, a brief look at the 
French-American Corporation's continued activities is necessary. As 
previously mentioned, French-American Corporation continued buying banks 
throughout California. It was able to purchase banks anywhere in the 
state because the court injunction imposed on United Security did not 
apply to French-American. Because many of these banks that were pur-
chased were not eligible to merge with United Security or the Bank of 
Italy for one reason or another, French-American had built up over a 
year and a half, a large independent system throughout California. 
Each bank operated as an independent unit bank, with its own name and 
office·rs, but directly responsible to French-American and Giannini. 
All used the Bank of Italy's policies and, when additional funds might 
be needed, arrangements had to be made to secure such funds. The 
French-American system was in essence a "chain" bank system. 
By mid-1928 the system controlled fifty-five independent banks op-
erating all over California (Figure 15). Giann:i,.ni disliked chain bankmg 
I . 
because the system was not one bank with many branches, but fifty-five 
independent banks. Giannini sought to eliminate this situation by 
Figure J 5. 
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bringing all the French-American independents into one of his two branch 
systems. 
Consolidation into the Bank of America, California 
Because of the court action which limited United Security to North-
ern California, the process to complete the bank's statewide branch bank 
system took on the look of the development of the Liberty Bank of 
America. Giannini's first move was to change the name of the United 
Security to end the court injunction imposed on it. He did this bymerg-
ing the United Security with the Bank of America and its three branches 
in the Los Angeles area in November, 1928. This is the same bank that 
Giannini had so wisely left out of the Liberty Bank of America consoli-
dation in February, 1927 and retained its charter as a state bank. 
With the merger he was able to merge the French-Anierican Corpora-
tion's independents into the new bank which he had not been able to do 
earlier because of assorted legal problems. The Bank of America then 
moved its head office to San Francisco. The name United Security was 
dropped and the bank became the Bank of America, California. While 
this merger was in its final states, Giannini made arrangements to buy 
the Merchants National Trust and Savings Association of Los Angeles. 
Merchants N.T.S.A. had recently grown at a tremendous rate in and 
around Los Angeles. This growth was largely a result of a merger with 
Hellman Commercial Trust and Savings Bank of Los Angeles two years ear-
lier. The Hellman Bank, if we can regress for a moment, was one of the 
leaders in branch banking in the Los Angeles region since 1920 (see 
Chapter III). It was one of the seven major banks that had been com-
peting with Giannini's banks for branch permits in booming Los Angeles 
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during the 1920's. 
The Hellman Rank was originally several unit banks controlled by 
Herman Hellman in and around Los Angeles. Hellman was not particularly 
fond of branch hanking as such, but his two sons were, and when he gave 
control of these banks to his·sons, they converted them into one small 
system under the banner of the Hellman Rank, The system had, in 1920, 
six branches -- one as far away as Blythe on the Arizona border (Figure 
16). 8 
As Los Angeles blossomed during the 1920's, so did the Hellman 
Bank. The Los Angeles land boom created a demand for additional bank-
ing facilities. It had brought about "a condition of traffic congestion 
in the central city that was brought about by the establishment of the 
so-called 'service station' branches", of which the Hellman Bank was a 
9 leader. By the end of 1923 the Hellman Bank had twenty-three branches 
In and around Los Angeles, extending as far east as San Bernadina, as 
the Blythe branch had been closed, (Figure 17). 
In 1926 the Hellman Bank had built up a system of thirty-one 
branches around Los Angeles. It merged with the Merchants National Bank 
of Los Angeles, bringing in the strong resources it owned. The merger 
brought in only three branches, but gave the system an impressive 
$100,000,000 in resources. The bank's name was changed to the Merchants 
National Trust and Savings Association and two more branches were added 
before the merger with the Hank of America, California (Figure 18). 
The Merchants N. T. S. A. was the kind of institution A. P. 
Clannini was looking for in the Los Angeles regipn. It had a number of 
branches already established and had an attractive commercial 
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chants. N.T.S.A. from its national bank status and merged its branches 
into the Bank of America, California's system in December, 1928. With 
the merger, six branches were closed or consolid2,ted and the headquar-
ters of the Bank of America, California, was moved to Los Angeles. 
This merger gave the new system 138 branches statewide (Figure 19) and 
over $350,000,000 in resources.10 With this, the French-American 
Corporation was dissolved and e.11 stock it controlled converted to 
Bancitaly stock. Giannini now controlled his two major branch systems 
t hroug.h one holding company, Banc ital y Corporation. 
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Although no geographical patterns emerged in the purchasing of one 
single unit bank around California in the development of the two ~ranch 
systems to t.his point, a pattern does emerge for the major branch sys-
tems which were acquired. This is the zonal pattern which is developed 
by the various banks acquired by the Bank of Italy or the Bank of 
America, California. 
In the case of the formation of the Liberty Bank of America in 
Chapter III, the Liberty Bank developed north of the Tehachapi Line, 
while the Commercial N.T.S.A., Bank of America, Los Angeles, and the 
Southern Trust and Savings Bank developed south of the line. This was 
a result of restraints imposed by the various state superintendents of 
banks or rulings by the Federal Reserve Board, who were opposed to 
statewide branch banking. In the formation of the Bank of America, 
California, the same pattern emerged in its development, until final 
consolidation. The United Security Bank and its predecessors were lim-
ited to growth in the north, like the Liberty Bank. The Hellman Bank, 
later to be the Merchants N.T.S.A., were developing in the south like 
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intendents of banks and because of the court injunction placed on United 
Security. The French-American system cannot be included because it was 
not one hank, but fifty-five individual banks. Even the Bank of Italy 
wh.ich started its statewide branch bank system in earnest in 1913 when 
.it opened its Los Angeles branches, was limited until 1927 with the 
va~t majority of its development north of the Tehachapi Line. 
With the creation of the Bank of America, California, statewide 
branch bank system in December, 1928, for the last time a Giannini bank 
was restricted to operate in just one region of California. Giannini's 
two branch bank systems continued to expand for the next two years. the 
Bank of Italy mainly in San Francisco (because of the McFadden Act), and 
the Bank of America, California statewide. Giannini's next move was to 
merge the two systems into one Bank of America. 
Consolidation into the Bank of America National 
Trust and Savings Association 
In the next two years each bank's branch system added a number of 
branches to the various areas of California. The Bank of America, 
California added twenty-five more branches statewide~ bringing its total 
to 163 (Figure 20). The Bank of Italy had added twenty branches to its 
system, all of which were located in San Francisco, bringing that city's 
total branches close to the number located in Los Angeles, and the total 
number of branches statewide to over 100 (Figure 21). 
As the merger of these two branch bank systems approached, a series 
of events occurred, which altered the history of the Giannini banks and 
their continued branch expansion. 
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Giannini for years had dreamed of a nationwide branch system of banks, 
much llke that of Canadian banks, after which he modeled his California 
Hyslem. In attempting to estahlish such a nationwide system, Giannini 
formed Transamerica to replace all the previous holding companies, and 
giving it control of all his banks. Transamerica now controlled the 
Bank of Italy, Bank of America, California, as well as the Bank of 
America, New York, and major banks in Washington, Oregon and Nevada. 
Additionally, it controlled various insurance, real estate and stock 
companies. With Transamerica (as the name indicates), Giannini hoped to 
push his style of banking all across the country. 
Secondly, in October, 1929, the stock market crash brought on the 
great depression. The two Giannini branch bank systems in California 
(as well as the other Transamerica Banks) held on strong while a great 
many banks around the country failed. It was a period of enormous eco-
nomic hardship even for the Giannini banks, which helped to almost break 
up his branch bank systems. 
Lastly, A. P. Giannini decided he would retire from active partici-
pation in the banks and Transamerica. Elisha Walker, a banker from New 
York and associated with the Bank of America there, was broeght in as 
chairman of Transamerica. Giannini hoped that Walker, along with his 
sor L. M. (Mario) Giannini, would carry on all of his banking policies 
and continue to expand his program of statewide and now nationwide 
branch banking. A. P. Giannini went off to Europe for retirement leav-
ing Walker completely in charge. 
Walker got off to a good start as he entered his new office. To 
achieve nationwide branch banking, he felt (as A. P. Giannini did earli-
er) that the first move was to bring the two California branch bank 
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systems under the same bannEr. With Transamerica owning two banks named 
Bank of America (in New York and California), it was felt that the new 
bank should merge under the name Bank of America rather than the Bank of 
Italy. 
The first step towards this merger was to move the Bank of America, 
California head office back once again to San Francisco, as to comply 
with the McFadden Act. Once this had been done application was made to 
nwrge the Bank of Italy and the Bank of America, California into one 
system. Because of the McFadden Act only 106 branches of the Bank of 
America, California were eligible for the merger. Twenty-six of the 106 
hranches would be eliminated through consolidation with existing Bank of 
Italy branches. Fifty-seven branches were not eligible for the merger. 
This posed only a slight problem for Walker. The Bank of America, 
California charter was maintained and the fifty-seven branches that were 
ineligible, along with seven other Transamerica owned unit banks were 
merged to form the Bank of America (State), 11 (Figure 22) on November 
1, 1930. 
On the same day the Bank of Italy N.T.S.A. absorbed the Bank of 
America, California, and its name was changed to the Bank of America 
National Trust and Savings Association (Figure 23). Although the Bank 
of America was legally two banks, one national and one state, the same 
name appeared outside cf the branches and 
• . . never were two legally separate banks more closely bound 
together. With the same officers and directors and virtually 
the same name, about the only distinction was that the national 
bank operated under federal authority and the state bank under 
state authority.12 
The merger of the Bank of Italy and the Pank of America, California 
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Figure 22. Bank of America (State), 1930 
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agreed. Mario Giannini tired of trying to get Walker to run things the 
."Bank of Italy way", soon resigned from Transamerica, leaving for the 
first time neither father or son without any say in the day-to-day op-
eration of the Bank of Italy, now the Bank of America. 
It soon appeared that Walker was not loyal to Giannini's goal of 
nationwide branch banking, but loyal to powerful New York banking inter-
ests who wished to gain control of Transamerica.. Transamerica stock 
which had held relatively firm in its price on the market began to drop 
as Walker planned to sell off the banks it controlled, one by one to the 
New York people. The Transamerica stock also had dropped because of the 
depression and Walker's bad management of its banking interests. As the 
price became right, Walker began to carry out his plan to sell the banks 
of Transamerica. 
The first step was to sell the Bank of America in New York, which 
was done in mid-1931. The New York banking interests made enormous 
gains through the purchase. Walker's.policies continued to allow depos-
its to drop and debts to build for the other Transamerica banks. A. P. 
Giannini who had been in poor health while in Europe, had been trying to 
return and regain control to put an end to the destruction of his bank-
ing empire. A. P. finally recovered and returned to the United States 
in September, 1931 to try to put a stop to the Walker plan. 
Along with his son Mario, A. P. began to rally Transamerica stock-
holders to save the banks from being broken up. Many of the Trans-
america stockholders had been with Giannini since he founded the Bank of 
Italy in 1904. There were literally thousands qf small stockholders in 
Transamerica which the Gianninis appealed to. The proxy fight for 
stockholder$' votes lasted for six months -- uptil the next stockholders 
meeting in March,1932. At that meeting, the Gianninis won a landslide 
victory which brought them back into control of Transamerica and the 
banks it owned. 
86 
Essentially it was the "little man" who brought the Gianninis back 
into power. A. P. had the foresight when he founded the Bank of Italy 
in 1904 to spread ownership to as many people as possible. These little 
people rallied enough support to save the break-up of the Bank of Amer-
ica, which so many shared a common interest. It was as A. P. Giannini 
said in 1904 that "no man will be permitted to win power enough to c1.om-
inate its (now the Bank of America) policies unwisely. 1113 From virtual 
break-up of the system in 1932 and in the midst of the great depression, 
A. P. Giannini and his son Mario began to rebuild the Bank of America's 
deposits and reputation. 
In the next two years, under Giannini management, the Bank of 
America began to recover. This recovery was aided by the election of 
Roosevelt and his "New Deal" policies. The first order of business was 
to repay government loans and other debts incurred during the two years 
of the Walker regime. Once deposits began to go up, the debts were paid 
off and Giannini slowly began to resume his branch expansion program, 
through the Bank of America (State). During the next two years, the 
Bank of America (State) added a net of seven new branches (Figure 24) 
and moved its head office back to San Francisco (when the merger estab-
lished the Bank of America (State) in 1931, its head office w.s.s listed 
_as Los Angeles) once again. 
In 1933 a new law was passed by Congress to,. help banks avoid the 
disasters of the past four years of the depression that closed many of 
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vision that provided national banks with the right to operate branches 
on a statewide basis, if state banks had that same right. This new law 
would enable the Bank of America N.T.S.A. to merge all of the Bank of 
America (State) branches at any time in the future. 
Giannlni in December, 1934 merged sixty-one of the Bank of America 
(State) branches it was now ope.rating into the Bank of America N. T. S .A. 
Giannini always wary of unforeseen events, retained the state charter 
and eight of the: Bank of America (State) branche:s (Figure 25), untill 
October, 1937, when they were finally brought into the Bank of America 
N.T.S.A. system. 
The Bank of Arnerice N.T.S.A. had been growing on its own account 
since the Bank Act of 1933. By 1935, it had a total of 421 branches 
throughout California (Figure 26). In addition to the branches which 
were merged from the Bank of America (State), the Bank of America 
N.T.S.A. purchased thirty-seven new branches and opened thtrty branches 
de novo by 1937. A. P. stepped down in 1936 to let Mario run the day-
to-day operations as the Bank of America and the nation recovered from 
the great depression. As shown in Figure 27, it was indeed a compli-
cated series of mergers and purchases which culminated into one Bank of 
America N.T.S.A. in 1937. The Bank of America N.T.S.A. continued to 
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1Andrew F. Rolle, California, ~History (New York, 1969), p. 531. 
2southworth, p. 162. 
3Note that this was 1923 and the regional theory of branch 
is very evident here in the map of the United Bank's branches. 
United's branches are ln the San Francisco region, north of the 
Tehachapi Line. 
4 James, p. 224. 
5Hearings, p. 1350. 
6rbid. 
7Ibid. 
8southworth, p. 54. 
9 . . 
Ibid. , p. 66. 
lOHearings, p. 1432. 
banking 
All 
11 (State). This word after the title Bank of America was first used 
by the directors of Transamerica to distinguish between the state bank 
and the national bank in California and the New York bank of the same 
name. It is used extensively in reports and legal documents by Trans-
america and by authors such as James and Dana. The author has chosen to 
denote the state bank in a similar manner, which keeps it consistent for 
those familiar with the bank's history. . 
12 James, p. 310. 
13n ·. so ana, p. • 
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CHAPTER V 
CONTINUED BRANCH EXPANS,ION 1938-1970 
The Bank of America in the next three decades continued to expand 
its system of branch banks throughout California. By 1970, the bank 
had added 480 new branches; double the number it had as of 1937. This 
phenomenal growth can be attributed to a variety of explanations. One 
of the major reasor.s for the growth was the Bank of America's branch 
system being able to respond to the enormous population growth California 
experienced during that time. 
The population explosion began with America's entry into World 
War II and dwarfed any earlier migration waves into California. The 
population in California grew from 6,900,000 in 1940 to 8,100,000 by 
1945. At the end of World War II most of the new residents stayed in 
California. As the forties became the fifties California's population 
continuec to swell by about a half a million every year. During the ten 
year period, California experienced a growth of 48.5 percent or an 
additional 5,000,000 people. Seventy percent of the new population was 
located in Soethern California. By 1970 California's population had 
reached nearly twenty million making it the most populous state.in the 
Uni.on. Particular counties in California also experienced tremendous 
growth. Orange County, just south of Los Angele~ grew at a rate of 
over 225 percent in the twenty years prior to 1970. 
In addition to the phenomenal population growth, California also 
93 
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experienced enormous economic growth during the period between 1938 and 
1970. During World War II, "war money" (U.S. Defense Department) entered 
California more than into any other state in the union. Much of the 
economic boom between 1938 and 1970 was due to an enormous incursion of 
new capital through large federal expenditures, which new industry built 
on. "The War enabled Cal_ifornia to compress almost a generation's 
industrial growth into a few years.'rl To cap this off, United States 
and world demands on California's cash crops reached an all time high. 
After the war and on into the fifties and sixties the continued arrival 
of thousands of people created great demands for housing, schools, a 
transportation network, and automobiles. Federal expenditures continued 
to. flow into California's industry because of its well developed aero-
space industry as well as the advent of the Korean and Viet Nam wars. 
Certain California areas were rapidly being converted from one of 
rural character to that of an urban state. With the urbanization of 
these California areas, came many problems such as smog, water pollution 
and the paving over of thousands of acres of farmland each year. During 
this period of rapid change, the Bank of America with its statewide 
branch bank system was well prepared. No other bank came near the num-
ber of branches the Bank of America had throughout California. With the 
influx of more people and more money, the branch system allowed the Bank 
of America's resources to grow at a tremendous rate, hecoming the 
world's largest bank in 1945. 
Growth between 1938-1945 
The Gianninis (A. P. and Mario) continued to guide the Bank of 
America on the road to recovery in the late 1930's. They began to have 
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the Bank of America open new branches and develop new banking programs. 
For an example, Timeplan, a new type of personal loan, continued to in-
crease husJness. Branch expansion occurred everywhere in the state as 
the Bank of America continued to expand wherever opportunity lent it-
self. By 1940 the Bank of America had 495 branchee in California (Figure 
28) and resources of over $1.6 billion. 
During the last two yee.rs of the 1930 's and on to the 1940' s the 
Bank of America faced some stiff opposition for its continued expan-
sion. Much of it occurred in the persons of Henry Morgenthau, Secretary 
of the Treasury, and Marriner Eccles, heacl. of the Federal Rei:erve Board. 
Both men disliked A. P. Giannini and sought to bring down Giannini and 
Transamerica. They brought Transamerica to court in 1938 (through the 
Securities ExchaP.ge Commission), on a number of charges attempting to 
break up Transamerica's various bank holdlngs, especially the Bank of 
Ameri.ca. 
The Gianninis had been divesting the stock Transamerica owned in 
the Bank of America since 1932 when they regained control. By the time 
the suit was brought aga5.nst Transameri.ca, it owned only about twenty 
percent of Bank of America's stock. The action seemed aimed specifi-
cally at A. P. Giannini and his son, not Transamerica. Another reason 
for the action may be in the fact that many of the men who Giannini 
fired when he regained control of Transamerica in 1932, were now work-
ing for Morganthau or Eccles. After the start of the Securities Exchange 
Commission's action, the Bank of America was granted only a minimum num-
ber of permits for new branches. The case continued on into 1940 and 
was never fully resolved although an official compromise was reached in 
March, 1940. 2 It illustrates yet another attempt to curb the Bank of 
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America's growth and alter its natural expansion. With the advent of 
World War II some of the animosity receded as the nation concentrated 
its efforts on the war. 
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All through World War II, the Bank of America continued to build up 
its resources, but because of the problems in Washington with Morganthau, 
new branch permits were almost non-existent. As a result of consolida-
tion of a few branches and the closing of others, the Bank of America 
actually lost two branches giving it a total of 493 as of 1945. Al~ 
though the number of branches declined, this decline did not hold true 
for the bank resources. The war, as previously mentioned, brought to 
California a great number of people and a growing economy. These work-
ers having nothing to spend their earnings on (because of war rationing) 
deposited their money in the banks. The Bank of America with its large 
branch bank system was convenient to many and it therefore received a 
large share of deposits. The new deposits of the workers in the Bank of 
America were added to by the new accounts of the military personnel 
based in California. The Bank of America also set up "temporary 
branches" on military bases which enabled military personnel to trans-
act weekly bank business. The bank was able to set up these "temporary 
branches", using a technicality in the Bank Act of 1935 calling them 
"seasonal agencies" and operated them only one or two days a week. 
After the war, some of these temporary military branch banks were 
maintained as permanent branches such as the one at Hamilton Air Force 
Base in Marin County. 
By July 1943 the Bank of America's total resources had reached 
over $3.1 billion. This figure was over a billion dollars more than 
when the war started. 3 As the war continued, money and people also 
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continued to pour into California. By the time the war was grinding 
to a stop in the summer of 1945, the Bank of America passed the~ Chase 
Manhattan Bank of New York, by accumulating over $5 billion in assets 
and thereby becoming the world's largest bank. The Bank of America's 
resources had grown by a little more than a billion dollars a year dur-
ing the war, while the major New York banks had been losing resources. 
With all this growth, the Bank of America's present 493 branches were 
being swamped. Some branches were enlarged to several times their 
original floor space, but to no avail as customers at these branches 
still spilled out onto the streets. 
Branch Growth 1945-1960 
At the end of World War II a renewed branch expansion program was 
beginning to be developed for the Bank·of America. With Roosevelt's 
death, Morganthau resigned, bringing into office a new Secretary of the 
Treasury. Morganthau, during his tenure as Secretary of the Treasury, 
had influenced the rejection of many Bank of America branch permits and 
effectively limited its branch expansion. He had been so successful in 
limiting the bank's branch growth that in 1946 some financial writers 
(as had in 1927) once again predicted that: 
the expansion days of the Bank of America are probably 
over. Although the bank has opened eleven new branches in 
the last eighteen months, its coverage is pretty complete. 
The basic pattern has been established. Some Californians 
can talk about how it might become a $10 billion bank some-
time in the future without adding any considerable number of 
branches.4 
The Banl: of America as it had in 1927, did not listen to its crit-
ics and continued to operate just as it had for forty years, expanding 
the branch system at every opportunity, lately trying to keep up with 
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Cal:lforn:la's great population boom. Two events put·a damper on this 
growth prior to 1950. 
The first event was that another law suit was brought against 
Transamerica (which had by this time reduced its Bank of America hold-
ings to seven percent), this time by the Federal Reserve Board invoking 
the Clayton Anti-trust Law for the first time. This investigation was 
headed by Eccles and once again accused Transamerica on a number of 
charges, including monopolistic banking practices. The court battle 
lasted until 1953 when the Supreme Court reversed the Federal Reserve 
Board's ruling against the Bank of America in April, 1952. The major 
effect was that in 1950, Bank of America attempted to merge twenty-three 
I 
unit banks controlled by Transamerica, which the Federal Reserve Board 
effectively prevented. The unit banks were actually merged into the 
system for several months, but the Bank of America was forced to re-
convert these branches into their original form. Table One lists the 
cities where these banks were located. 
The second event was in June, 1949 when A. P. Giannini died. The 
Bank of America's daily operations and continued growth then fell 
squarely on Mario Giannini's shoulders. The Bank of America was to 
carry on becoming increasingly bigger, but the loss of A. P. Giannini 
was indeed a sad day. A close associate was to comment, "The economics, 
sociological and political consequences of the great depression of the 
thirties would have been far more traumatic without California's branch 
bank system built by A. P. Giannini." .5 His bank indeed continued to 
grow, even with the resistance that it was gettipg from Washington. By 
1950 the Bank of America was able to add thirty-one branches giving it 
526 branches statewide (Figure 29) and resources of over 6.8 billion 
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TABLE I 
RECONVERTED TRANSAMERICA UNIT BANKS* 
Beaumont Pino la 
Bellflower Redeo 
Corcoran San Andreas 
Crockett San Jacinto 
Crows Landing Santa Ana 
Garden Grove Santa Barbara 
Los Altos Tehachapi 
Moon Park Temple City 
Newman Turlock 
Pasadena (2) Watts (Los Angeles) 
Patterson Weed 
*Cities where Transamerica unit banks were located and merged into the 
Bank of America branch bank system on June 26, 1950 then 
reconverted back to its unit bank status on August 7, 1950 
due to a Federal Reserve Board ruling. If there was more 
than one unit bank in a particular city which was involved 
in the ruling, the number next to the city indicates how 
many banks were involved. 
Source: Bank of America, Branch Historical Record, 1971. 
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In studying Figure 29 it becomes evident that most of the new 
growth the Bank of America has experienced is in the urban areas around 
the San Francisco Bay area and in the Los Angeles area. The Sacramento 
and Fresno urban areas also show marked increases. As the population of 
all these areas continued to grow a new geographical pattern for expan-
sion for the Bank of America started to emerge. Bank of America 
planners began to develop a new program for branch expanE.ion (based on a 
set of variables, to be discussed), because of California's enormous 
population growth, and the availability of unit banks for purchase be-
came less and less. Once a location is determined to be able to adopt a 
new branch, an application for a de nova branch was made. 
A new set of policies and procedures was developed for selecting 
sites for the new branches. The Bank of America was the leader in 
branch banking from the beginning and once again it set a precedent for 
other banks to follow. Among the most important factors considered 
are "historical, current and projected population totals". 6 Other 
important economic and demographic data includes: median age of resi-
dents , household income, housing value, local employee income, existing 
and proposed industrial and commercial development, residential activity 
and trends and traffic patterns. 7 
The Bank of America planners did not set down a minimum threshold 
population for a new branch site, but chose its location considering all 
thE: previously mentioned data. Once the data had been assembled for a 
new site, which the Bank of America planners felt would be a prime lo-
' 
cation to be adopted into the system, the site was purchased and 
application made for the new branch. With this new basis for planning 
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and adding branches it can be seen how the de nova branch took on great 
importance to the continued development of the Bank of America's branch 
bank system. The system like any new idea tried by the Bank of America 
hegan slowly, but soon was applied as more and more new sites were 
sought for branch expansion. By 1953 (the Eisenhower era) there was 
little or no resistance from Washington, so the Bank of America soon be-
gan to add branches as fast as California was growing. 
The surviving member of the father-son team, L. M. (Mario) 
Giannini who had built the Bank of America into the world's largest 
bank, died in September, 1952, outliving his father by only three years. 
Mario knowing that he was not strong, wisely set up a ten-man committee 
to run the bank as he entered the hospital in March,1952. From these 
ten officers, Carl F. Wente was elected president upon the death of 
Mario Giannini. It was the first time other than the Elisha Walker 
era, that a Giannini had not been directing the growth of the bank. 
In Carl Wente the Bank of America had a new president who believed 
wholly in the Giannini philosophy of "banking services for all the 
people11 • 8 Wente had joined the Bank of America in 1918 and worked his 
way up to manager, then at the head office in San Francisco to vice-
president. He then served as president of the First National Bank of 
Nevada (a Transamerica bank) for three years, before returning to the 
Bank of America as senior vice-president in 1943. Wente served as 
pre!"ident of the Bank of America for two years before retiring at the 
mandatory age of sixty-five. 
During his tenure as president, Wente lead ,t;:he Bank of America and 
Transamerica to a successful conclusion of the court battle with the 
Federal Reserve Board. The Bank of America continued to build its 
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branch system under Wente developing further the Bank's program of 
hranch site planning. The Bank of America had built its number of 
l1rnnches to 574 statewide and resources of $8.5 billion shortly after 
We11te Htepped down ln early 1954. In April, 1954, Wente was succeeded 
by S. Clark Beise as president of the Bank of America. Wente's tenure 
,,ms important becc-.use he was successful in leading the Bank of America 
through the transition perio,d from the powerful influence of the two 
Gianninis to new leadership in Beise:. The Bank of America continued 
its growth through the transition and Beise was handed a bank stronger 
than ever in the Giannini tradition. 
Clark Beise's accession to the presidency of the Bank of America 
symbolized a change in the Bank of America from the turbulent years of 
the Giannini era to settled management.9 With Eeise, the Bank of 
America was able to finally calm suspicion among New York bankers and 
the Washington bureaucrats. As he did this, Beise continued the 
Ciannini tradition that stated "what is good for California is good for 
the Bank" .1 O 
Under Beise the Bank of America continued to grow, gaining in its 
number of branches and resources. He began to run the bank in the 
pattern of a typical large industrial corporation. The new pattern pro-
vides decentralization to encourage branch manc:.gers to scratch for 
business and at headquarters, group management to integrate current tac-
. d f 11 tics an map uture strategy. Under Beise's direction the Bank of 
America developed several innovative programs to enable continued expan-
sion of its branches and resources throughout tqe rest of the 19SO's and 
on into the 1960's. 
The first was to rapidly expand the Bank of America's overseas 
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operations, developing these branches into an important part of the Bank 
of America's future business. As American influence began to spread in 
importance around the world in the 1950's, Beise had the Bank of America 
move to expand its operations overseas, as to serve its growing number 
of customers worldwide. The expansion of its worldwide operation became 
very important to the future of the Bank of America's operations, but 
further discussion of the expansion is beyond the scope of this study. 
Secondly, Beise had the Bank of America become the first bank to 
move into the electronics age with the development of "ERMA", the first 
fully automated electronic accounting system in banking. "ERMA" was the 
predecessor to our modern computers as BeisE: saw electronics as essen-
tial to continue the Bank of America's expansion program. "ERMA" 
opened up new vistas in terms of the bank's operating costs, by allowing 
faster and more efficient processing of the massive amounts of paperwork 
accumulated by the Bank of America's dB.y to day operations. "ERMA" 
thereby allowed for continued branch expansion which by 1957 was booming 
much like California's population. 
The third innovation by Beise as president of the Bank of America 
was the creation of Bankamericard, an all-purpose credit card service 
started in 1958 and in the futurE added enormous gains to the Bank of 
America's earnings. Like all the Bank of America's innovations over 
the years, Bankamericard started out slowly, but soon caught on, expand-
ing rapidly. In 1958 there was a mailing of 500,000 credit cards to 
Bank of America customers. By January, 1960, Bankamericard had over 
2 million card holders throughout California. This new source of in-
come helped the Bank of America's resources reach almost $12 billion in 
1960. 
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The Bank of America's branch bank system had· also shared in this 
growth. In 1960 the bank had 707 branches in California (Figure 30), 
an increase of over 125 from 1955 and over 200 new branches since the 
end of World War II. Much of thi.s new branch expansion was located in 
the major urban areas of the San Francisco Bay area and the Los Angeles 
metropolitan region. As 1960 began a new decade, the Bank of America 
and California both continue to grow at a tremendous rate. 
Expan~ion 1960-1970 
The Ban.k of America stepped up its br:anc.h expansion pa.ce by ad.ding 
forty-three brancbes statewi.de jn 1960, anc. continued to add to its vast 
resources. It i.s able to do so becc:.use by 1960 it had the distinction 
of serving the ns.tion' s fastest growj_ng state, which in 1970 became the 
m0:-.st populot'.s state in the country. Beise wns expanding OP.. thE: "ERMA" 
system, with a new gene:rat.ion of computers end all of tl-.e banks programs 
\\'en~ running Sil'oothly. Bankamerice.rd was expe.ndfng phenomEmally, and 
the bank continued t.o make ell types of loa.ns as well as financing real 
estate mortgages. Under Beise, the Bank of Amf!rica conti.nued to serve 
CaUfornia's "little people" in their banking needs, and in Beise's 
words, "continues to get our share ar:d a little more 11 .12 
In Novemlter 1963, Beise rEached the e.ge of sixty-five, mandatory 
retirement age at the Bank of America, and was succeeC!ed by Rudolph M. 
Peterson as president. Peterson who originally joined the Bank of 
Americc: in 1936, had helpe.d Mario Giannini pioneer the bank's "Time-
plan" pror,ram of installment loans. Peterson, a.~ did his predecessors, 
moved up through the ranks of the Bank of America to senior vice-presi-
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Bank of Hawaii. After five years of successful operation in Hawaii 
he came back to the Bank of America to serve as vice-chairman, in charge 
of the bank's general management. Peterson was groomed to be Beise's 
successor, and ascended to the presidency in 1963. Rudolph Peterson, 
like all the Bank of America's high officials was a firm believer in 
the policies originally set down by A. P. Giannini. He. believed in the 
pe.rsonal touch that Bank of America had always tried to give its 
customers. By the time Peterson retired as president in January, 1970 
the Eank of America had 955 branches (Figure 31) statewide· and resources 
over $25 billion, five times larger than the resources it he].d at the 
end of World War rr.13 
The branch growth the Bank of America experienced during the 1960's 
under Peterson's leadership was again concer•trated in the major urban 
i:.reas of California. The Los Angeles metropolitan region, the San 
Francisco Bay area and Sacramento each gained a large number of new 
branches. These were the same urban areas which were experiencing enor-
mous population grcwth and economic good times. 
Orange County, part of the Los Angeles metropolitan area, for ex-
ample, was prior to 1950 an arfa of orange groves. and truck farming, to 
which the urban sprawl of Los Angeles had just begun to encroach. It 
had a number of Bank of America branches scattered throughout the: county, 
serving the r.eeds of the farmers and the small cities which "·ere located 
there, giving the bank a good base from which to expand. As the 1950's 
became the 1960's Orange.County's population boomed, absorbing much of 
the Los_ Angeles urban growth which had overflowed out into its rural 
environs. By 1970, there were several established cities well over 
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fields. Cities like Santa Ana, Anahiem, and Orange where there were 
only a few branches of the Bank of Americe prior to 1960, had between 
five and ten branches each. 
The areas around Los Angeles anc. San Francisco Bay also experienced 
tremendous growth in population and continued to maintain a large number 
of branches. Los Angeles had in 1970 ninety-three branches in the city, 
and San Francisco had sixty-two. Sacramento which had just eleven 
branchE:s in 1950 now hE.d ti.;·enty-seven more than the entire Bank of Italy 
branch bank system in 1920. Table Two summarizes the: comparitive growth 
from 1940 of each of the:se city's populations and branches as well as 
all those California cities having five or more branches by 1970. 
As the decade of the 1960's came to an end the Bank of America was 
as strong as ever and still growing. At this writing the Bank of 
America has continued to develop and opportunities for new branches are 
expected to continue throughout California, although 11 ·the rapid branch 
banking expansion of the 1950's and 1960's is not anticipated" by branch 
planners in the future.14 The cost of branch expansion for the Bank of 
America is becoming exorbitant anc. the rate of population growth in 
California has begun to slow. Bank of America planners also see the 
transformation of the United. States and California into the so-called 
"cashless, checkless society". Therefore a much slower rate of branch 
expansion is expected by the Bank of America planners in the next dec-
ade. l.5 Future branch expansion by the Bank of America will depend 
greatly on the actual population and economic growth of California and 






















DATA FOR CALIFORNIA CITIES HAVI~G 5 OR MORE BANK OF AMERICA BRANCHES BY 1970 
1940 1950 1960 1970 
PoEulation/Branches PoEulation/Branches PoEulation/Branches PoEulation/Branches 
646,536/46 775,357/47 740,316/51 715,674/62 
1,504,277/85 1,970,358/85 2,479,015/91 2,816,111/93 
302,163/18 384,575/18 367,548/21 316,613/26 
203,341/ 7 334,387/ 8 573,224/10 696,566/20 
164,271/ 6 250,767/ 6 334,168/11 358,673/15 
85,547/ 5 113,805/ 5 111,268/ 6 116,689/ 6 
105,958/ 6 137 '572/11 191,667/15 254,364/27 
60,658/ 4 91,669/ 5 133,929/ 9 165,972/12 
68,457/ 3 95,280/ 4 204,196/ 9 446,504/20 
43,646/ 3 63,058/ 4 91,922/ 4 104,394/ 6 
34,696/ 1 46,746/ 2 84,332/ 4 139,769/ 7 
11,031/ 1 14,556/ 1 104,184/ 4 166,118/ 7 
31,921/ 1 45,533/ 1 100,350/ 4 156,520/ 6 
7,907/ 1 10,027/ 1 26,444/ 1 77 ,292/ 5 
81,864/ 3 104,577/ 3 116,407/ 4 113,254/ 5 
82,582/ 2 95,702/ 3 119,442/ 3 132,774/ 5 
34,958/ 2 44,854/ 2 58,768/ 3 70,211/ 5 
29,255/ 2 34,784/ 2 56,848/ 4 69,515/ 7 




Conclusion and Summary 
The objec tJve of this thesis was to describe and map the spatial 
chunge Ln the Bank of America's branch bank system between 1904 and 
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1970. This study shows how the growth of the Bank of America's branch 
hank system has occurred in a series of stages since the bank's first 
branch in 1907. Figure 32 illustrates the stages in which this growth 
occurred first as the Bank of Italy then as the Bank of America. The 
first stage from 1907 to 1921 the Bank of Italy pioneered branch banking 
statewide in California opening branches up and down the agricultural 
valleys of Northern California and in Los Angeles. The policies adopted 
by the bank allowed for continued growth in the bank's resources, provid-
ing it with the necessary capital to purchase new branches. Additionally 
it began a program to allow for branch expansion in full accordance with 
the California Bank Act of 190-9 for which it had no precedent. 
The Bank of Italy during this period ran up against its first 
opposition to its statewide branch expansion in 1919 with the State 
Superintendent of Banks, Charles Stern. Stern established an artificial 
barrier for continued branch growth for the Bank of America at the Tehach-
api Mountain range and effectively slowed the bank's growth south of the 
range. It was almost three years before the Bank of America received a 
new branch and was to expand in accordance with the zonal theory of 
branch banking, one zone being the San Francisco zone, north of the Tehach-
api Line and the other the Los Angeles zone, south of the Tehachapi Line. 
The second stage of growth can be called the zonal period of branch 
bank expansion, which lasts from 1921 to 1928 .. ·It is during this period 
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tion boom (the first being thE: Gold Rush of 1849) by continuing expan-
sion of his branch bank system through variom: holding companies. The 
holding companies allowed Giannini to obtain banks in both California 
zones and develop their branch systems much as he would have the Bank 
of Italy had not it been restricted by successive state superintendents 
of banks and new restrictions imposed by federal authorities. 
ThE branch bank expaPsion during the zonal period occurred in two 
distinct stages. The first was culminatec with the formation of thE 
Bank of Italy Nationccl Trust and Savings Association in 1927 anc the 
second was the formation of the Pank of America, California system in 
1928. The mergers which occurred in 1927, as explained in Chapter III, 
ended state authorities from restricting the bank's branch expansion to 
zones, but did not end the federal rEstrictions. Thus thE Bank of Italy 
N.T.S.A. was limited to San Francisco in its continued. branch expanE.ion. 
Giannini took advantage of cooperation by the state superintendE·nt of 
banks and continued branch expansion through his state banks as de-
scrihEd in Chapter IV. 
The zonal theory once again c.ppeared in 1928 because of a court in-
junction imposed on a Gi.anrini bank over the \rnrd "security". The zonal 
problem camE: to c-cn end with a new merger and a crange in thE: state 
bank's name to remove the \rnrd "security". The zonal period mc.rkE:d 
phenomenal growth of the Bank of Italy and Bank of America, California 
branch systems through bank purchases and mergers made possible by thE: 
bank holding companies. ThE: capital to provide the funds for all these 
pirchases was r-ro\·ided by sound management and progressive banking 
methodE; developed by Giannini as well as continuec. prosperity in 
California. As the branch system continued to grow, so did the bank's 
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vast resources. 
In the third period of growth, The Bank of America (following the 
merger of the Bank of Italy N.T.S.A. and the Bank of America, Califor-
nia) slowed in its natural expansion. This was due to two reasons as 
explained in Chapter IV: the mismanagement of the Walker regime and 
the great depression. The slowed branch growth ends with the Gianninis 
winning back control of the bank in Transamerica's proxy fight of 1932. 
This period is also highlighted by final mergers of the two branch 
systems controlled by one holding company, Transamerica, and the "road 
to recovery". Also the period marks final federal restrictions on 
branch banking in California with the passage of the Banking Act of 
1933. This law provided the Bank of America with the opportunity to 
renew its branch expansion and opened the door to the phenomenal post 
World War II growth. 
The last period of branch growth was from 1938 through 1970. 
This period was marked by restrictions imposed by federal authorities 
hostile to the Bank of America from 1938-1945 and boom expansion after 
the wsr, as described earlier in this chapter. Although branch growth 
stopped through the war years, The Bank of America resources grew at 
a phenomenal pace making it the largest bank in the world. Califor-
nia started a third population boom which began with World War II 
and as of 1970 had just begun to level out. This population growth 
and continued economic prosperity provided the Bank of America 
with a base to develop its continued branch expansion, and mushroom-
ing resources. This continued growth is summari,zed in Table Three. 
The Bank of America after 1950, to keep up ,with California's enor-
mous population growth, especially in the urban areas, established the 
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TABLE III 
GROWTH OF THE BANK OF AMERICA AND CALIFORNIA, 1904-1970 
Number of Total California 
Year Branches Resources Population -----
1904 0 $ 285,000 1,485,000 
1910 3 6,539,000 2,378,000 
1915 8 22,321,000 
1920 25 157,464,000 3,426,861 
1925 95 422,838,000 
1930 352 1,171,425,000 5' 677 '000 
1935 421 1,256,132,000 
1940 495 1,817,535,000 6, 909 ,.000 
1945 493 5,037,500,000 
1950 526 6,863,358,000 10,586,000 
1955 574 9,163,000,000 
1960 707 11,942,000,000 15,717,000 
1965 890 16,529,000,000 
1970 955 25,500,000,000 19,953,000 
117 
majority of its branches de novo. 
The Bank of America branch bank system indeed expanded in a series 
of discernible patterns. The first was its rural expansion prior to 
1920, followed by the zonal expansion and finally boom expansion in 
the urban areas. The Bank of America's branch bank system is now so 
extensive in California, that there is not a town or city where a Bank 
of America branch is more than a twenty minute drive. Had not state 
and federal restrictions been periodically imposed, the patterns 
discussed would probably have been different. California's enormous 
population growth and strong economy (both its agriculturally and 
industrially diverse base) provided the bank the opportunity for expan-
sion. 
Undoubtedly the policies established by A. P. Giannini and carried 
on by his successors played the major role in the great expansion of the 
Bank of America's branch bank system. It had become what A. P. Giannini 
had also insisted it be, a bank built for and on the masses, a bank for 
the "little people". 
Future Research 
As previously mentioned the objective of this thesis was to de-
scribe the changing spa.tial distribution of the Bank of America from 
1904 through 1970. It has been largely qualitative in its approach and 
in order to describe this process, has involved a variety of disci-
plines including geographical, social, economic, political and 
historical factors. Because of the complex nature of putting all of 
these factors together in explaining the interrelation of each, on the 
Bank of America's development, additional statistical analysis could 
have been included. Further statistical analysis might provide addi-
tional insight into the Bank of America's past and future growth. 
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The study has provided only an analysis of the Bank of America's 
California branch development. This allows for excellent possibilities 
for further research of not only the Bank of America, but other banking 
institutions. For example, a study cf the Bank of America overseas 
development could be done as well as a study of Transamerica's branch 
system and its multistate operations. Additionally, the study of 
another California or U. S. bank's development or a Canadian branch bank 
system and the geographical development of each could provide additional 
understanding in the spatial development of banking. 
0 
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